Inferiorizing Judicial Review: Popular Constitutionalism in Trial Courts by Aronson, Ori
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform 
Volume 43
2010 
Inferiorizing Judicial Review: Popular Constitutionalism in Trial 
Courts 
Ori Aronson 
Harvard Law School 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mjlr 
 Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, Courts Commons, and the Supreme Court of the United 
States Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Ori Aronson, Inferiorizing Judicial Review: Popular Constitutionalism in Trial Courts, 43 U. MICH. J. L. 
REFORM 971 (2010). 
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mjlr/vol43/iss4/4 
 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform at 
University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in University of 
Michigan Journal of Law Reform by an authorized editor of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship 
Repository. For more information, please contact mlaw.repository@umich.edu. 
INFERIORIZING JUDICIAL REVIEW:
POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM IN TRIAL COURTS
Ori Aronson*
The ongoing debates over the legitimacy of judicial review-the power of courts to
strike down unconstitutional statutes-as well as the evolving school of thought
called "popular constitutionalism, " are characterized by a preoccupation with the
Supreme Court as the embodiment ofjudicial power This is a striking shortcoming
in prevailing constitutional theory, given the fact that in the United States, infe-
rior courts engage in constitutional adjudication and in acts ofjudicial review on
a daily basis, in ways that are importantly different from the familiar practices of
the Supreme Court. The Article breaks down this monolithic concept of "the courts"
by shifting the focus to the lower levels of the judicial system. Trial court adjudica-
tion is revealed to hold a unique transformative potential for constitutionalism:
the possible enhancement of civic participation, public deliberation, and value
pluralism in the process of creating constitutional meanings.
The Article presents an argument for "inferiorizing"judicial review, i.e., relegat-
ing the power of judicial review to the federal district courts, and removing the
Supreme Court from this practice. The inferiorizing model-a procedurally simple,
though conceptually radical, jurisdictional shift-is shown to have a redeeming
potential for judicial review as a democratically legitimate means of enforcing con-
stitutional rights; while at the same time providing a robust institutional setting
for the exercise of popular constitutionalism. Although it would be very difficult to
bring about a full inferiorizing shift in constitutional adjudication, the Article
exposes the possibilities for democracy-enhancing institutional innovation; these
possibilities become available to constitutional actors once the institutional diver-
sity of courts is recognized.
INTRODUCTION
For a variety of reasons, some better than others, the debate in
U.S. legal scholarship over the legitimacy of judicial review-the
power of courts to strike down legislation due to a violation of the
Constitution-is alive and well. The debate takes on different
forms and accommodates different kinds of arguments, but two
central themes of normative critique emerge as the most salient:
one seeks to undermine the power of courts to exercise judicial
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sity of Jerusalem. I am grateful to Martha Minow, Mark Tushnet, Jed Shugerman, Hanoch
Dagan, Rosalind Dixon, Alon Harel, Amnon Lehavi, Hila Shamir, and Adam Shinar for invalu-
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review altogether; the other questions the assumption of suprem-
acy of judicial interpretations of the Constitution, an assumption
that has been attached to the exercise of judicial review since at
least half a century ago.'
At the same time, the intellectual project of popular constitu-
tionalism has been gaining force and content in U.S. constitutional
theory. By tracking the modes of popular engagement through
which constitutional meanings have been and are being generated,
popular constitutionalists offer a democratic vision of constitution-
alism that occurs primarily away from the courts. While accounts of
popular constitutionalism do not necessarily undermine the le-
gitimacy of judicial review-both can be understood as
complementary modes of generating constitutional meaning-they
do deny the exclusivity ofjudicial interpretation as the only mecha-
nism for making constitutional law (constitutional amendment
notwithstanding), and in that sense contribute to fracturing the
perceived reality of judicial supremacy, if not its formal sustainabil-
ity.
One of the consistently common characteristics of these two
bodies of scholarship-the judicial review debate and the popular
constitutionalism literature-is their perception of judicial review
and of the question of judicial supremacy as having to do solely
with the nature and actions of the Supreme Court. Constitutional
adjudication, which takes place on a daily basis in all levels of state
and federal court systems, is reduced in most scholarly works to the
sparse pronouncements of the nine justices of the Supreme Court
during the Court's annual terms. While the prominence of the Su-
preme Court in any account of constitutional law is of course
understandable, it is less justifiable in normative discussions of in-
stitutional design, which is the kind of discussion the judicial
review debates and a lot of the popular constitutionalism literature
is engaged in. Arguing about judicial power in constitutional sys-
tems while bearing a monolithic concept of "the courts" in mind,
based on a strictly "Supreme-Courtian" paradigm of adjudication,
misses the great variations that exist among different courts of dif-
ferent levels and functions within any given system.
Based on this insight, I offer in this Article an intervention in
the debates over judicial review and the literature on popular con-
stitutionalism, which is based on an institutional design framework:
1. As Morton Horwitz brackets it, following Larry Kramer, this is the supremacy as-
sumption that was "expressly articulated in Cooper v. Aaron and acted upon in Bush v. Gore."
Morton J. Horwitz, A Historiography of the People Themselves and Popular Constitutionalism, 81
Cm.-KNT L. REv. 813, 814 (2006) (citing Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958); Bush v. Gore,
531 U.S. 98 (2000)).
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I call for breaking down the concept of "the courts" into its varied
components, and shifting the focus to the practices of lower (infe-
rior) courts. The Article traces in trial court adjudication a
transformative potential for constitutionalism-a potential that, if
recognized and utilized, could lead to a re-substantiation of the
practice of judicial review as a legitimate means for enforcing con-
stitutional rights, and at the same time promote democratic values
that are crucial for the thriving of constitutionalism in our time:
civic participation, public deliberation, and value pluralism. This
potential, which embraces both politics and adjudication as com-
plimentary modes of generating constitutional meaning, can
hardly be noticed, let alone put to use, under the prevailing Su-
preme-Courtian paradigm ofjudicial review.
In order to fulfill this institutional potential, the Article presents
an argument for "inferiorizing" judicial review. That is, the Article
proposes eliminating the power of high courts to exercise judicial
review, while retaining it at the level of trial court adjudication.
Under the inferiorizing model, district courts would be author-
ized-as they are today-to strike down statutes they deem
unconstitutional, but this determination would be final and unap-
pealable: the parties involved would be bound by the judicial
determination, but it would not have a precedential effect on other
similar cases. The trial court becomes a focal apparatus for consti-
tutional deliberation, in which individual members of the
constituency face the state (indeed, "the law") in repeated
matches, arguing the meaning of constitutional provisions and
generating a multitude of results-some diverse, some conver-
gent-over time and space. These series ofjudicial iterations would
provide the material-vocabulary, arguments, test cases, various
outcomes-for popular deliberation on the meaning of the Consti-
tution; while at the same time enforcing the Constitution on a
(literally) case-by-case basis. For the purpose of this Article, the
proposed shift would be limited to constitutional adjudication in-
voking the rights-provisions of the Constitution-I leave out, for
now, constitutional challenges premised on the structural clauses
of the Constitution, which raise distinct concerns.
2. I also leave state courts out of the model. Like federal district courts, state courts
are initially authorized to strike down statutes for (federal) constitutional reasons. State
courts, however, invoke unique concerns, such as the prevalence of judicial elections, and
extreme jurisdictional complexities. These characteristics complicate the institutional prem-
ises of the inferiorizing model, and require a separate assessment that is beyond the scope of
this Article. The model, then, grants final constitutional discretion to federal district courts
alone.
SUMMER 2010] 973
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Taking judicial review away from the Supreme Court is of course
a hard sell; too much power has to be given up by justices and ap-
pointers, and too much of the focus of scholars, interest groups,
reporters, and politicians has to be divided between different
courts and constituencies. The very power of tradition is also a sig-
nificant barrier in itself. This Article may therefore be read not
necessarily as a realistic call to eliminate the constitutional role of
the Supreme Court, but rather as an invitation to consider how
constitutionalism would look in an inferiorized system of one de-
gree or another, and to reflect on judicial review and on popular
constitutionalism with this vision in mind. Above all, this Article
explores institutional possibilities for innovation. It does so by
pointing to institutional structures and practices that already exist
and are, at least in theory, available for designers to identify and
utilize.
Part I of the Article surveys the central themes of the judicial re-
view debate, and tracks the democratic values that could arguably
animate the future of that debate. In Part II I discuss the litera-
ture's capture by the Supreme-Courtian paradigm, set against the
background of the prolific constitutional adjudication exercised by
trial courts in diffuse systems of judicial review, like that of the
United States. I examine the effect of the Supreme-Courtian para-
digm on the critiques ofjudicial review, as well as on the practice of
constitutional litigation. In Part III the focus shifts fully to the trial
courts. I explore three unique institutional characteristics of trial
courts-their behavior as street-level bureaucracies, their relative
institutional obscurity, and their structural multiplicity-and con-
sider the transformative potential these characteristics have for
constitutionalism. In Part IV I put the potential to practice by de-
lineating the details of the inferiorizing model of judicial review. I
present it as an institutional model of popular constitutionalism.
Part V considers several strong objections to the inferiorizing
model, and tries to respond to them. Part VI presents a set of chal-
lenges to implementing the inferiorizing model and explores its
applicability to several complicated contingencies. Part VII is a
conclusion.
I. THE JUDICIAL REVIEW DEBATE: PAST AND FUTURE
The legitimacy of judicial review-that is, for the purpose of this
Article, the practice by courts of striking down legislative acts due
to violations of the Constitution-is being continuously questioned
in the United States. While this has been the case ever since the
[VOL. 43:4
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practice of judicial review was introduced into the U.S. legal sys-
tem,3 the last several years have seen what seems to be a surge in
the calls for reconsideration of this age-old practice.4 When these
various critiques are abstracted, four central arguments emerge in
opposition to judicial review: (1) Judicial review is at odds with
democratic rule; (2) The courts are not professionally adequate
arbiters of morally-laden issues; (3) Judicial review impedes,
numbs, and diverts political deliberation on constitutional issues;
(4) Judicial review is an elitist mechanism for preserving the social
structure. The core arguments for each of these concerns are pre-
sented below. Subsequently, the three central normative positions
with regard to the future of judicial review are surveyed: these are
the calls for eliminating judicial review altogether; altering its
power structure; and maintaining the current practice unchanged.
A. Four Difficulties with Judicial Review
(1) Anti-democratic. The oldest critique in the "new wave" of cri-
tiques of judicial review is that which emerged anew with
Alexander Bickel's Least Dangerous Branch,5 namely, that judicial
review is countermajoritarian, and thus in its very essence is at
odds with democracy. The well-known argument is that allowing
non-elected and unremoveable judges and justices to overrule
procedurally valid decisions of periodically elected bodies
(namely Congress) undermines the very bedrock of democratic
rule-majoritarian decision-making by elected representatives who
are institutionally accountable to popular will. This is a "difficulty"
with any constitutional regime,6 but it is most severe in constitutional
regimes like that of the United States, in which the Constitution is
relatively old and practically unamendable. Under a rule of judicial
review, the will of current majorities-as exhibited through legisla-
tive acts of elected representatives-is being overruled by an
unelected minority, which at best follows the dictates of past genera-
tions, and at worst applies its own set of beliefs and mores.
3. See, e.g., LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONAL-
ISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 93-144 (2004); Barry Friedman, The History of the
Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part I" Reconstruction's Political Court, 91 GEO. L.J. 1 (2002).
4. See Richard H. Fallon,Jr., The Core of an Uneasy CaseforJudicial Review, 121 HARV. L.
REV. 1693, 1694-95 (2008).
5. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT
THE BAR OF POLITICS (1962).
6. Arguably, one could conceive a constitutional regime in which constitutional
judges are periodically elected by popular majorities. This is not the case in any jurisdiction
in the world currently.
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Democracy-understood as government through the aggregated
will of current majorities-is therefore undermined by the com-
bined will of current minorities and past generations.
(2) Not professionally adequate. A second difficulty with judicial re-
view is that even if one supports a constitutional regime, in the
sense that current majorities should be bound by the value and
procedure determinations of past majorities (or, often, past super-
majorities), then judges are not necessarily, and to some necessar-
ily not, the best equipped agents of constitutional interpretation
and application.7 While judges, bound by their professional ethos,
focus on interpreting texts, adhering to or distinguishing earlier
precedents, and cloaking their ideological standpoints, legislators
regularly drive to the heart of moral disagreements and openly en-
gage with the policy implications of their determinations. Because
constitutional interpretation calls for moral and political delibera-
tion, legislatures may be more suited for the job, and therefore also
more legitimate.8
(3) Inhibits Deliberation. A third theme of the attack on judicial
review concerns the effects of'judicial review on the strength of the
democratic culture and on such values as participation, delibera-
tion, and public engagement in the political process. According to
this argument, leaving the final interpretation and application of
the Constitution to the courts numbs the public forums that are
both functionally and democratically more suited to conduct moral
deliberation and to produce legitimate political determinations:
most notably, elected legislatures and their originating processes-
party politics and electoral campaigns. 9 Rather than "fight it out" in
the forums of public deliberation, both constituents and represen-
tatives often defer to the stylized, alienated, paternalistic, and
assumedly conclusive determinations of a professional judiciary in
a wide variety of deeply contested issues of value. This loss of par-
ticipation and public deliberation harms democratic legitimacy,
erodes public attentiveness to injustices and rights-violations and to
popular capabilities to address them, undermines the shared ex-
perience of a political community, marginalizes "have-nots," and
7. See Mark Tushnet, Evaluating Congressional Constitutional Interpretation: Some Criteria
and Two Informal Case Studies, 50 DUKE L.J. 1395 (2001).
8. SeeJeremy Waldron, The Core of the Case Against Judicial Review, 115 YALE L.J. 1346,
1376-95 (2006).
9. See Larry D. Kramer, The Supreme Court, 2000 Term-Foreword: We the Court, 115
HARV. L. REV. 4, 162-68 (2001).
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empowers "haves" and legal repeat-players. For deliberative visions
of democracy, judicial review may be an inhibiting force. 0
(4) Elitist. A fourth kind of critique of judicial review aims at the
socially elitist nature of the practice. Judicial review is typically
practiced by usually affluent, usually white, usually male, judges
who enjoy-at least since they were exempted from circuit duties
and granted the power of certiorari-an institutionalized aloof-
ness. Judges and, more so, justices, who normally belong to an elite
class within their society, hold themselves capable of providing the
national constituency with a definitive interpretation of their
founding tenets. This practice legitimates and preserves an existing
social order: it legitimates the political structure by wielding a
rhetoric of rights.1 While this critique is applicable to many judi-
cial practices, it may be argued that judicial review is the most
extreme case of judicial anti-populism. Judicial review lets judges
have their way with the essentials that define the polity-the consti-
tution-which is arguably the field where popular energy may be
most obviously and directly exerted. 2
B. Whereto Judicial Review? Three Normative Positions
(1) Away with it. The most radical consequence-relative to the
status quo-emanating from the set of critiques mounted against
the practice of judicial review is a call to abandon it altogether. Ac-
cording to this view, courts should eliminate the practice of
invalidating statutes due to what they perceive as violations of the
Constitution.2 This can certainly be done by way of constitutional
amendment; but it can presumably also be achieved by "mere" ju-
risdiction-stripping legislation, since judicial review is not explicitly
included in the judicial power vested in the Supreme Court and
lower courts by Article III of the Constitution. 4 In fact, as Mark
Tushnet has suggested, 15 one could imagine the Supreme Court
10. See CHRISTOPHER F. ZuRN, DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY AND THE INSTITUTIONS OF
JUDICIAL REVIEW 141-49 (2007).
11. See, e.g., Ran Hirsch], The Political Origins of the New Constitutionalism, 11 IND. J.
GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 71, 84-105 (2004).
12. See Frank I. Michelman, Comment: Popular Law and the Doubtful Case Rule, 81 CHI.-
KENT L. REV. 1109, 1110-11 (2006); Allan C. Hutchinson, A "Hard Core" Case Against Judicial
Review, 121 HARV. L. REV. F. 57, 63-64 (2008), http://www.harvardlawreview.org/media/
pdf/hutchinson.pdf (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform).
13. See, e.g., MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS
(1999); Waldron, supra note 8.
14. U.S. CONST. art. 1!l.
15. TUSHNET, supra note 13, at 154.
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itself declaring an end to the judicial review "experiment" it
launched two centuries ago in Marbury v. Madison.6
The argument for giving up judicial review altogether asks to re-
turn the full force of constitutional deliberation to the explicitly-
political branches of government. The fact that judicial review has
led to some of the most cherished social and political achievements
in the history of the nation, notably above all racial desegrega-
tion, 17 is countered by equally-egregious political outcomes
engendered by the Supreme Court's constitutional jurisprudence,
perhaps most notably the entrenchment of slavery8 and the affir-
mation of segregation 9 and internment.20 Similarly, by exhibiting a
completely mixed record of progressive and conservative jurispru-
dence, the practice of judicial review defies consequential support
from any ideological wing. Finally, even ifjudicial review could be a
useful mechanism in correcting specific failures of democracy (no-
tably, the disenfranchisement of discrete and insular minorities),21
and even if courts managed to decide such cases correctly (accord-
ing to one's choice of a theory of constitutional interpretation),
there is no valid institutional or doctrinal way of limiting courts to
use their power only in these unique (and arguably scarce) cases,
and therefore the benefits of retaining judicial review are out-
weighed by the costs of the practice.
Taking the courts out of the constitutional playground, the ar-
gument goes, would "return all constitutional decision-making to
the people acting politically,, 22 that is, in the contemporary model
of democracy, to elected representatives deliberating, bargaining,
and legislating by way of majority votes; to elected chief-executives;
and to popular modes of public engagement.2' This outcome, its
supporters argue, is more democratic (in Bickel's sense), it is more
professional (because legislatures are often better assessors of con-
16. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
17. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). Even here, opinions famously diverge
on the actual role of the Court's decision in Brown in bringing about the eventual racial
desegregation of public schools. See, e.g., MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL
RIGHTS: THE SUPREME COURT AND THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY 344-442 (2004);
GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE?
39-169 (1991).
18. Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
19. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
20. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
21. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 73-
104 (1980).
22. TUSHNET, supra note 13, at 154; see also RICHARD D. PARKER, "HERE, THE PEOPLE
RULE": A CONSTITUTIONAL POPULIST MANIFESTO 93-115 (1994) ("There are no supra-
political guarantees of anything. All there is is politics." Id. at 114.).
23. See Hutchinson, supra note 12, at 61-64.
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stitutional rights and values), it is more deliberative (because it di-
rects constitutional discourse to the institution designed for
deliberation), and it is more populist because it eliminates an elite-
based avenue of constitutionalism.
(2) Re-calibrate the scales. Short of eliminating judicial review alto-
gether, but still seeking to transform the power grid that it sustains,
most prescriptive critiques of judicial review call for an elimination
of its supremacy effect. 24 This view supports-or at least does not
abhor-the continuation of the practice of judicial review through
the courts. But it does deny the assumption-whose age and origin
are in dispute-that a constitutional utterance by the Supreme
Court is final, supreme, and unchallengeable by any other agent of
government, except for the People themselves, acting as framers
through the formal amendment process. When compared with
other systems of judicial review, the supremacy effect of the U.S.
system is often termed "strong-form" judicial review; the alternative
being "weak-form" judicial review, in which some kind of institu-
tional arrangement leaves the last word on constitutional matters
to popularly-elected officials.25
The attack on judicial supremacy is probably the most common
thread in the current wave of scholarship questioning the legiti-
macy of the U.S. model of judicial review, especially given its
influence-and competition-in other constitutional democracies
around the world, both young and old. Supremacy, it is argued,
impedes vibrant constitutional discourse and departmental dia-
logue. 26 It stifles popular engagement and coerces popular will.
27
Courts, it is granted, may have a valuable role in a polity's continu-
ing debate over the meaning of its Constitution, and the Supreme
Court is an important agent of constitutional discourse among the
branches of government. The Court offers a singular kind of con-
stitutional argumentation (textually-embedded, precedent-based,
case-sensitive), which is augmented by a unique institutional insu-
larity (thanks to life appointments and benefit protections). But
granting it the last word in the most foundational-indeed,
24. See generally KRAMER, supra note 3; ADRIAN VERMEULE, LAW AND THE LIMITS OF
REASON 57-1 22 (2009).
25. See Mark Tushnet, Alternative Forms of Judicial Review, 101 MICH. L. REv. 2781
(2003); Mark Tushnet, Weak-Form Judicial Review and "Core" Civil Liberties, 41 HARv. C.R.-C.L.
L. REv. 1 (2006).
26. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, Constitutional Horticulture: Delib-
eration-Respecting Judicial Review, 87 TEX. L. REv. 1273, 1284-86 (2009) (discussing the
"deliberation-ending" potential ofjudicial review).
27. KRAMER, supra note 3, at 233 (arguing that judicial supremacy "has fundamentally
altered the meaning of republican citizenship by, as a conceptual matter, taking ordinary
people out of the process of shaping constitutional law").
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constitutive-issues that confront the nation throughout its gen-
erations, is to concede too much democratic power to an
essentially non-democratic body of government.
The structural alternatives to judicial supremacy are varied, and
weak-form judicial review can be performed in different ways. The
British Human Rights Act authorizes courts to declare the incom-
patibility of a statute with Britain's obligations under the European
human rights regime, and thus compel the legislature to rethink
the legislation-but not to strike it down.28 The Canadian Charter
of Rights and Freedoms authorizes the legislature to enact statutes
violating certain rights even in the face of judicial review, condi-
tioned by an explicit "notwithstanding" provision.29 And in the
United States, various collisions have occurred between the Su-
preme Court and the political establishment which have, in effect,
amounted to the overriding of judicial review by contrarian gov-
ernmental action. The court-packing threat of President Roosevelt
in 1937 is possibly the most well-known such instance;3 and hints
of Congressional action in this avenue were evident in the Reli-
gious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993," which was enacted to
override a Supreme Court's interpretation of the First Amendment
(only later to be struck down by the Court).32
(3) Stay the course. The third group of responses to the amount-
ing critiques of judicial review acknowledges the various difficulties
associated with this practice, but maintains that all in all democracy
is better served by keeping judicial review in its current form. Al-
ready Bickel, who coined the phrase "countermajoritarian
difficulty," did so under the charitable title The Least Dangerous
Branch-having been infused by the success of the Supreme Court
in Brown v. Board of Education,33 he concluded that when executed
within the boundaries of the legitimate (as he tried to define
them), judicial review is an institution of great potential and prom-
ise, mostly because it commands not much more than the moral
power of its verbal utterances.34 Various institutional justifications
28. Human Rights Act, 1998, c. 42, § 4 (U.K); see Douglas W. Vick, The Human Rights
Act and the British Constitution, 37 TEX. INT'L L.J. 329, 351-56 (2002).
29. Constitution Act, 1982, pt. I, § 33 (Can.); see Jean Leclair, Judicial Review in Cana-
dian Constitutional Law: A Brief Overview, 36 GEo. WASH. INT'L L. REv. 543, 549 (2004). Israel
duplicated this arrangement in a very specific context. See Basic Law: Freedom of Occupa-
tion § 8,1994, S.H. 90 (Isr.).
30. See Barry Friedman, The History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part Four: Law's
Politics, 148 U. PA. L. Rv. 971,988-96, 1022-46 (2000).
31. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to 2000bb-4 (2006).
32. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
33. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
34. BICKEL, supra note 5, at 204.
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for the preservation of judicial review have been offered since.
These have depicted the courts as uniquely insular from politics and
therefore most suitable to police the abuses of the political process;
35
as a unique social locus for reason-based deliberation by participat-
ing citizens;36 as best serving the social interest in settlement of
second-order disagreements; 7 as an added valve of rights-protection
that works with legislatures to engender the welcome potential of
over-enforcement of rights; s8 and as singularly designed to accom-
modate the right of harmed individuals to argue their constitutional
challenges.39
Implied defense of the practice ofjudicial review can also be in-
ferred from historical and meta-historical narratives of U.S.
constitutional law, which question the capability of the Supreme
Court to actually bring about the detrimental effects described by
the detractors of judicial review. Thus, Bruce Ackerman's
Kuhnian 4° meta-narrative of constitutional revolutions allots a mere
partial role to the Supreme Court in the process of codifying con-
stitutional developments already formed and forged through a
deliberative political process. 41 A more direct challenge to the
countermajoritarian assumption is offered by the argument that
the Supreme Court has in fact consistently aligned itself with pub-
lic preferences in deciding contentious constitutional matters, with
the result that judicial review has not proven to be an anti-populist
or, indeed, a non-democratic institution.42 An intriguing coalition
in defense ofjudicial review therefore surfaces: between those who
support a check on majoritarian abuse of power, and those who
find in the courts a faithful reflection of majoritarian sensibilities.
Finally, in addition to the various arguments supporting the
preservation of the current practice of judicial review one should
restate the traditional justifications for judicial supremacy in mat-
ters of constitutionalism, which celebrates, rather than sidesteps, its
35. ELY, supra note 21.
36. Frank I. Michelman, Brennan and Democracy, 86 CAL. L. REV. 399, 425-26 (1998).
37. Larry Alexander & Frederick Schauer, Defending Judicial Supremacy: A Reply, 17
CONST. COMMENT. 455 (2000); Larry Alexander & Frederick Schauer, On Extrajudicial Consti-
tutionalInterpretation, 110 HARV. L. REv. 1359 (1997).
38. Fallon, supra note 4, at 1694.
39. Yuval Eylon & Alon Harel, The Right to Judicial Review, 92 VA. L. REv. 991 (2006).
40. Frank Michelman first identified the evident connection between Ackerman's his-
toriographical project and Thomas Kuhn's The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. See Frank
Michelman, Law's Republic, 97 YALE L.J. 1493, 1522-23 (1988).
41. 1 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS (1991).
42. NEAL DEVTNS & Louis FISHER, THE DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION (2004); Barry
Friedman, Dialogue and Judicial Review, 91 MICH. L. REv. 577 (1993).
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countermajoritarian effect. This is Marshall's premise in Marbury,s
as reaffirmed in Cooper." the notion that courts are the final inter-
preters of a nation's legal documents, including its constitution,
which is the supreme law of the land. This is the pure separation of
powers theory: super-majoritarian politics create the constitution,
majoritarian politics make laws, and courts interpret both, enforc-
ing the subjugation of the laws to the constitution: since legislators
are also subject to the rule of law, they must abide by judicial appli-
cation of the law to their actions, including acts of legislation.
C. New Functions for Judicial Review:
Participation, Deliberation, Pluralism
The debate about the legitimacy of judicial review is primarily
concerned with the effects of overruling majoritarian enactments
on democratic theory, and with the judicial and political dynamics
that arise out of these effects. Judicial review litigation, however, is
also a unique forum for pressing claims, formulating arguments,
and engaging in debate over constitutional meanings. In this re-
gard, the institutional setting that is designed for the practice of
judicial review may have significant implications for three proce-
dural values that are essential for democracy to thrive: individual
participation, public deliberation, and value pluralism.
(1) Participation. Participation is the opportunity for members of
the polity to take active part in the political process and thus affect
the content and meaning of legal norms-to effectively engage in
jurisgenesis." In contemporary representative democracies, de-
mocratic participation can and does take various forms-from
voting in periodic elections to running for elected office to sharing
an opinion on matters of social choice. Promoting participation in
the processes ofjurisgenesis is a way of enhancing the democratic
ideal of self-government, because it multiplies the avenues through
which individuals can affect the laws that govern them. At the same
time, greater participation also provides greater legitimacy for the
legal order, because the people subject to it share a stake in its
creation and are aware of the capacity of their agency to promote
further change in its existing modalities.
43. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) ("It is emphatically the
province and duty of thejudicial department to say what the law is.").
44. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958) (stating "the basic principle that the fed-
eral judiciary is supreme in the exposition of the law of the Constitution").
45. See Robert M. Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982 Term-Foreword: Nomos and Narrative,
97 HARV. L. REV. 4, 11-19 (1983).
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Arguing any legal claim in court is an avenue of democratic par-
ticipation: it enables individual litigants, attorneys, and social
movements to engage with the government-judges, prosecutors,
defenders-on what laws say and what they should say, and there-
fore to affect the content of the legal order. Arguing a constitutional
claim in court, however, is democratic participation of a higher or-
der, since it is an opportunity to affect the meaning of the norms
that are at the foundation of the legal order. The institutional
guarantee for this kind of participation is right of access: the pro-
tected opportunity to arrive at court, present an argument, and
stand a chance for the argument to affect the outcome of the legal
process.
(2) Deliberation. Deliberation is the process of reasoned decision-
making through discussion. In the context of democratic governance,
it requires those who make or affect social choices to take account of
arguments presented to them, and to justify their decisions by resort
to intelligible reasons. Models of deliberative democracy thus seek to
foster open and accessible spheres of arguing about, and presenting
46
reasons for, social action. Institutionalized deliberation ensures that
multiple relevant views on a given matter are meaningfully available
both to policy-makers and to those subject to policy, and therefore
that the interests of those who turn out "losers" in a given context
were taken into account and have a chance of prevailing in future
contests. Robust, dynamic, and inclusive modes of deliberative gov-
ernance render government more accountable, more
accommodating to critique and error-correction, and thus more de-
mocratically legitimate.47
(3) Pluralism. Value-pluralism is the accommodation of several,
sometimes incompatible, conceptions of the good in the public
spheres of law and politics. 4 As open societies abandon the fiction
of moral uniformity, and accept the legitimate coexistence of di-
vergent moral beliefs among their members, 9 democratic premises
of equality, dignity, and free speech are promoted. Consequently,
the institutions of normative ordering, including the practice of ju-
dicial review, realign accordingly, creating space in the process of
constitutional decision-making for a variety of moral beliefs and
46. For a general definition and justification, see, for example, AMY GUTMANN &
DENNIS THOMPSON, WHY DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY? 1-63 (2004);Jon Elster, Introduction, in
DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY 1, 8-13 (Jon Elster ed., 1998).
47. See GUTMANN & THOMPSON, supra note 46, at 125-38.
48. SeeJOHN RAwLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 36 (expanded ed. 2005) (describing "rea-
sonable pluralism"-"the diversity of reasonable comprehensive religious, philosophical,
and moral doctrines-as "a permanent feature of the public culture of democracy").
49. See Michelman, supra note 40, at 1506 ("If any social condition defines modern
American politics, plurality does.").
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understandings with respect to the constitutional foundations of the
state." This does not mean that constitutionalism is to be rendered
incapable of generating clear normative decrees; rather pluralism
aims to ensure that the process by which such results are generated
takes genuine and respectful account of the existing multitude of
moral beliefs.5'
The values of participation, deliberation, and pluralism are cor-
nerstones of liberal democracy, because they foster an engagement
by individual constituents in multiple modes of self-government
(i.e., more than just voting), while expressing, tolerating, and dig-
nifying the variety of beliefs and understandings on moral and
political issues that pervade heterogeneous societies. There is no
sphere of a democratic society in which these goals are more perti-
nent than in constitutional discourse. And there is no era that is
more demanding of novel institutional accommodations for these
democratic premises than the present: as formerly-disenfranchised
and formerly-unrecognized groups and classes are accepted into
the political sphere, and as immigration trends continuously diver-
sify societies, the design of constitutional adjudication that would
promote these democratic values becomes more essential than
ever.
This Article undertakes, then, a double project: by offering a
novel institutional setting for constitutional adjudication, it at-
tempts, first, to redeem judicial review as a worthy tool of
constitutionalism in face of its various critiques;52 and second, to re-
design judicial review as a constitutional practice that is capable of
facilitating the added functions of participation, deliberation, and
pluralism.53 The institutional setting where these two projects con-
verge is in the framework of the trial courts of the judicial system-
in the United States, the federal district courts. It is there where we
must now shift our focus.
50. See id. at 1532 ("[The Court] challenges 'the people's' self-enclosing tendency to
assume their own moral completion as they now are and thus to deny to themselves the
plurality on which their capacity for transformative self-renewal depends.").
51. See Martha Minow, The Supreme Court, 1986 Term-Foreword: Justice Engendered, 101
HARV. L. REv. 10, 74-82 (1987).
52. See supra Part IA
53. See supra Part I.C.
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II. STOP LOOKING AT THE CATHEDRAL: JUDICIAL REVIEW
AND THE SUPREME COURT CAPTURE
Although active, diverse, and prolific, the debate concerning ju-
dicial review-the central arguments of which were surveyed
above-is consistently premised on a single institutional unit as the
perpetrator, or bearer, of the practice of judicial review: the Su-
preme Court. Thus, all major critiques, and all major normative
responses to the critiques, focus almost solely on the acts and omis-
sions of the Supreme Court in its capacity as a constitutional
court.514 The methods and positions of the Supreme Court are un-
derstood to embody the judiciary as a whole-"the courts" are, for
all practical purposes, "the Court"-and therefore most scholarly
and political focus is directed at the decisions and decision-making
processes of "[n]ine [lawyers] in black robes,"55 the processes of
their nomination and appointment, and their judicial tenure. This
is a striking reality, if one considers the fact that the vast majority of
actual determinations ofjudicial review in the United States occur
in courts other than the Supreme Court.
6
In this Part, I begin by elaborating on the almost unnoticed but
pervasive phenomenon of inferior court judicial review. Against
this background, the persuasiveness of the central critiques ofjudi-
cial review turns out to be strongly linked to the bounded
conceptualization of judicial review as the monopoly of a single,
small, centralized body that resides in a marble shrine in Washing-
ton, D.C. I argue that things look different if we understand
judicial review to be a common practice of lower courts, as capture
by the constitutional practices of the Supreme Court leads to a
failure to recognize, and indeed to realize, the potential embedded
in the structural diffusion of adjudication for a more reconciled
form of judicial review, as well as for the fostering of democratic
values of participation, deliberation, and pluralism. The following
54. See Seth F. Kreimer, Exploring the Dark Matter ofJudicial Review: A Constitutional Cen-
sus of the 1990s, 5 Wm. & MARY BILL RTs.J. 427, 430 (1997); Sanford Levinson, On Positivism
and Potted Plants: "Inferior"Judges and the Task of Constitutional Interpretation, 25 CONN. L. REv.
843, 843-44 (1993) (citing Frederick Schauer, The Occasions of Constitutional Interpretation, 72
B.U. L. REv. 729, 729 (1992)) (discussing Schauer's critique of the scholarly "preoccupa-
tion" with the Supreme Court's constitutional interpretation).
55. Barry Friedman, The Birth of an Academic Obsession: The History of the Countermajori-
tarian Difficulty, Part Five, 112 YALE L.J. 153, 196 & n.180 (2002) (quoting Limitation of
AppellateJurisdiction of the United States Supreme Court: Hearings on S. 2646 Before the Subcomm. to
Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act and Other Internal Security Laws, 85th
Cong. 287 (1958) (statement of R. Carter Pittman)); see also DREw PEARSON & ROBERT S.
ALLEN, THE NIrE OLD MEN (1936).
56. See infra notes 64-70 and accompanying text.
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Part explores this potential by a detailed investigation of the
unique attributes of lower-court adjudication.
A. The Diffuse System ofJudicial Review
The U.S. system of constitutional adjudication upholds a diffuse
rule of jurisdiction over constitutional matters and judicial review.
This means that all courts within the system have the power to
strike down legislation that is found to violate the Constitution.
This is a prevalent institutional characteristic of common law sys-
tems, which are accustomed to legal development through the
continuous exchange between courts of varying hierarchical levels.
But it is not a necessary arrangement: other systems, including
ones heavily influenced by common law practice, have concen-
trated at least some of their constitutional adjudication in a single
tribunal (e.g., South Africa,58 France, ' 9 Israel6°); and the constitu-
tional structure in the United States actually envisages-and still
maintains, to a very limited degree-the Supreme Court as a court
of original jurisdiction for specific sorts of cases6 (these are mostly
disputes between states-however only very few such cases are in
fact heard by the Supreme Court each term62 ).
A central implication of the diffuse structure ofjudicial review in
the U.S. federal judiciary is that the system does entrust the lower
courts with the power to strike down state and federal legislation;
and that constitutional decisions entered by these courts are as
binding as any other unreviewed court order-in the case of a dis-
trict court decision, they bind the parties to the dispute, and in a
court of appeals backed by the doctrine of stare decisis, they bind all
57. See ALLAN R. BREWER-CARiAS, JUDICIAL REVIEW IN COMPARATIVE LAw 127-55
(1989); Aharon Barak, Judicial Review of the Constitutionality of Statutes: Centralism v. Decentral-
ism, 8 MISHPAT UMIMSHAL 13 (2005) (Isr.); Alec Stone Sweet, Why Europe Rejected American
Judicial Review and Why It May Not Matter, 101 MICH. L. REV. 2744, 2770-71 (2003); Robert F.
Utter & David C. Lundsgaard, Judicial Review in the New Nations of Central and Eastern Europe:
Some Thoughts from a Comparative Perspective, 54 OHIO ST. L.J. 559, 583-85 (1993).
58. See S. AsR. CONST. 1996, § 167(6); Lynn Berat, The Constitutional Court of South Af-
rica and Jurisdictional Questions: In the Interest ofJustice?, 3 INT'LJ. CONST. L. 39 (2005).
59. See 1958 LA CONSTITUTION [CONST.] 61, 61-1 (Fr.); Frederico Fabbrini, Ke/sen in
Paris: France's Constitutional Reform and the Introduction of A Posteriori Constitutional Review of
Legislation, 9 GERMAN L.J. 1297 (2008).
60. See SUZIE NAVOT, THE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF ISRAEL 160-62 (2007).
61. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
62. In the 2007 term, a single case out of 71 was decided under the Supreme Court's
original jurisdiction. AKIN GUMP STRAUSS HAUER & FELD LLP & SCOTUSBLOG.coM, END OF
TERM STATISTICAL ANALYSIS-OCTOBER TERM 2007 16 (2008), http://www.scotusblog.
com/wp/wp-content/uploads/2008/06/superstatpackotO7.pdf (on file with the University
of Michigan journal of Law Reform).
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district courts within the circuit.63 In the absence of review by a
higher court (because of failure to appeal, or to appeal in a timely
fashion, or to win certiorari, or for many other reasons), these de-
cisions are final. Thus, a single district court judge may hold a
statute unconstitutional, and so may a majority of a panel of circuit
judges sitting on a court of appeals, as may a majority of the nine
justices of the Supreme Court. And judges of the "inferior" courts
64
do so fairly often.
It is, of course, extremely hard to count the number of judicial
review decisions entered by inferior courts; let alone the number
of assertions of the power of judicial review made in cases where
statutes were eventually upheld. In the single most comprehensive
study to date of the practice of judicial review by federal trial
courts, Seth Kreimer managed to sample 431 cases involving con-
stitutional claims which were decided by district courts in the
65
course of the year 1994-a mere tenth of all such cases that year.
Given the steady growth of the federal caseload over the last two
decades, 66 it is safe to assume that the current numbers of constitu-
tional cases are much higher. That study found that 7.6% of trial
court constitutional cases were concerned with judicial review of
legislation. Kreimer emphasizes this finding as evidence for the
relatively minimal outright countermajoritarian effect of trial court
litigation. 6 But what seems to me most remarkable about this find-
ing is the quite large number-in absolute terms-of assertions of
the power of judicial review by the district courts of the federal sys-
tem: according to this statistic, in 1994 federal trial courts decided
63. See WALTER MURPHY, CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY: CREATING AND MAINTAINING
A JUST POLITICAL ORDER 261-62 (2007); RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS 380-82
(1996); Amanda Frost, The Limits of Advocacy, 59 DUKE L.J. 447,511-12 (2009).
64. By constitutional language, all federal courts which are not the Supreme Court are
"inferior Courts." U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
65. Kreimer, supra note 54, at 451.
66. During the 12 month period ending on September 30, 1992, 265,612 cases were
filed with the federal district courts. THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY, FEDERAL COURT MANAGEMENT
STATISTICS, http://www.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/cms.pl (on file with the University of Michi-
gan Journal of Law Reform). By the parallel period ending on September 30, 2007, the
number was 335,655. THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY, FEDERAL COURT MANAGEMENT STATISTICS,
http://www.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/cmsd2007.pl (on file with the University of Michigan
Journal of Law Reform).
67. Kreimer, supra note 54, at 452.
68. Id. at 466-67.
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about 330 challenges to the constitutionality of statutes." In the
same year, the U.S. Supreme Court decided a total of 82 cases.7 O
The institutional reality in the United States, then, is of pervasive
engagement by federal trial courts with the practice of judicial
review-an engagement that takes place away from the scholarly
and political limelight, and that demands a rethinking of existing
conceptions about judicial review.
B. Critiques ofJudicial Review and the Supreme Court Capture
Once the existence of a "Supreme Court capture" in the domi-
nant discourse concerning judicial review has been recognized, let
us revisit the arguments surveyed in Part I, in order to reassess
their bite in the new context of prolific constitutional adjudication
taking place in trial courts as well. While most of the central cri-
tiques of judicial review are often worded in general terms (as in
"Taking the Constitution Away from the Courts"'1), in essence they
are mostly concerned with one court. That is, most of the central
critiques of judicial review are in fact critiques of judicial review as
it is practiced by the Supreme Court; or, more accurately, as it is
perceived to be a practice of the Supreme Court alone.
The professionalism argument against judicial review maintains
that judges are not equipped to deal with the tough moral issues
implicated by the interpretation of constitutional rights, because
they are so enmeshed in "the law"-in developing its doctrines,
refining its procedures, following its precedents-that they become
poor judges of moral arguments and social justice.72 However, to
the extent that this critique holds, it seems mostly applicable to
high courts: such courts would be expected to be preoccupied with
formulating doctrine and setting precedent. By entering suppos-
edly authoritative decisions they judge for all judges, and in the
name of all judges. Because of the visibility of their decisions and
the lingering influence of their opinions, they are acutely con-
cerned with the style, coherence (or, often, the semblance of
coherence), and quality of argumentation. Having superior re-
search resources, they dedicate efforts to historical and (rarely)
69. The calculation, based on Kreimer's numbers, goes as follows: 431 (one tenth of all
constitutional cases) X 10 (the sum of all constitutional cases) X 7.6% (the share ofjudicial
review cases) = 327.56.
70. ALLCOUNTRIES.COM, U.S. SUPREME COURT-CAsEs FILED AND DISPOSITION,
http://www.allcountries.org/uscensus/356_u_ssupreme-courtcasesfiled.html (on file
with the University of MichiganJournal of Law Reform).
71. TUSHNET, supra note 13.
72. Waldron, supra note 8, at 1379-86; see also VERMEULE, supra note 24, at 82-90.
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comparative exploration. And, on top of all this, high court judges,
unlike their inferior counterparts, are indeed distant from the spe-
cifics of any individual case and therefore miss the institutional
advantage courts are thought to have over legislatures in assessing
the actual effects of legislation on real people.73 These are all de-
scriptions of appellate court adjudication; they have little to do
with the realities of trial courts, with their docket overloads, their
scarce resources, and their direct engagement with visible clients.
Similarly, the deliberation argument against judicial review-that
it overrides better modes of social decision-making with regard to
74
foundational issues -seems to have in mind a concept of the prac-
tice of judicial review as a process which involves authoritative,
finalized, top-down determinations by a centralized, minimally-
deliberative institutional entity. While such a perception is often
leveled at courts in general, it is questionable whether this is an
accurate account even of Supreme Court adjudication.7 5 At any
rate, this is certainly not the case when one considers the impor-
tant potential for deliberation through the institutional diffusion
of trial courts-the multiple opportunities for interaction between
judges, parties, attorneys, and social and political actors, and, as
importantly, between judges of different courts. Parts III and IV of
this Article elaborate on this potential.
Finally, the elitism argument derives heavily from the image of
"nine men in black robes"76-a persistent metaphor of institutional
elitism, simulating the U.S. process of constitutional decision-
making to the workings of a restricted-access and smoke-filled
men's club.77 It is worth investigating to what degree this percep-
tion is affected by such entrenched procedural conventions as the
Supreme Court's en banc panel, the promulgation of the Court's
majority decisions as the collective "Opinion[s] of the Court," or
even the justices' tendency of referring to previous holdings of the
Court in a quasi-royal "We" (as in, "in case X we held Y'). At any
rate, the institutional complexity, human diversity, and relative
73. It is worth quoting Jeremy Waldron, who when arguing this point basically con-
cedes, without explanation, its underlying Supreme-Courtian assumptions: "By the time
cases reach the high appellate levels we are mostly talking about in our disputes about judi-
cial review, almost all trace of the original flesh-and-blood right-holders has vanished, and
argument such as it is revolves around the abstract issue of the right in dispute." Waldron,
supra note 8, at 1379-80.
74. See, e.g., ZuRN, supra note 10; Roderick M. Hills, Jr., AteJudges Really More Principled
than Voters?, 37 U.S.F. L. REv. 37, 37-58 (2002).
75. See, e.g., Michelman, supra note 36, at 425-26.
76. See Friedman, supra note 55, at 196 n.180.
77. See Michael J. Klarman, What's So Great About Constitutionalism?, 93 Nw. U. L. REv.
145, 189-91 (1998).
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accessibility of a nation-wide system of trial courts all serve to provide
a relatively less elitist character to the exercise ofjudicial review.
Of the four major critiques ofjudicial review presented above in
Part I, only three need be reexamined in the context of the schol-
arly "Supreme Court capture." The fourth-to some, the most
salient-is the critique regarding the democratic deficit involved in
the practice ofjudicial review. Indeed, whether exercised by trial or
supreme courts, judicial review is a countermajoritarian measure.
To the extent that democracy is understood as a mechanism for
the effectuation of the will of current majorities through their rep-
resentatives, a shift in intellectual attention from the Supreme
Court to the district courts will not resolve the constitutionalist
conflict. But if one accepts the broader and, I believe, more pro-
found vision of democracy that encompasses mechanisms of
deliberation and participation and an effective accommodation of
value pluralism as essentials of dignified self-government,78 then an
institutional realignment of judicial review, from the Supreme
Court to the trial courts, has everything to do with preserving and
promoting democracy in a constitutional system.
The literature's capture by a Supreme-Courtian paradigm of
constitutional adjudication seems to skew the debate over judicial
review, and thus to miss important distinctions that could serve to
legitimate at least some institutional variations of this practice.
However, the preoccupation with the Supreme Court's constitu-
tionalism bears more than discursive costs. Shifting our gaze to the
trial courts would not only open up new institutional possibilities-
it might also alleviate some of the costs borne by various players in
the constitutional field, due to the preoccupation with the role of
the Supreme Court. The following section tracks these costs.
C. Further Detrimental Effects of the Supreme Court Capture
Several important players are affected by the focus on Supreme
Court adjudication as the single embodiment of judicial review:
inferior courtjudges, constituents who are actual or potential users
of the court system, and the institutions that are involved in design-
ing the makeup of the courts, namely the President and the Senate
that appoint and confirm federal judges and justices, and the me-
dia that vets them.
78. See ROBERT C. POST, CONSTITUTIONAL DOMAINS: DEMOCRACY, COMMUNITY, MAN-
AGEMENT 184-91 (1995); ZuRN, supra note 10, at 68-84; Alon Harel, Rights-Based Judicial
Review: A DemocraticJustification, 22 L. & PHIL. 247 (2003).
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(1) Inferior courts. Conscientious trial court judges, who practice
within a system that conceives of the Supreme Court as the only
legitimate source for constitutional meaning, are bound to submit
to a jurisprudence of deference .79 They seek to answer legal ques-
tions according to how the Supreme Court has said such questions
should be answered. In the absence of clear Supreme Court in-
struction, they look for sources of analogy and application in
indirectly related Supreme Court opinions. And, if the Supreme
Court has not offered any helpful utterance on the matter at hand,
they might engage in an exercise of prediction-attempting to
foresee what the high court would say of their decision if and when
the decision arrived before it on appeal. 0
It is important to note the conscientiousness of the judges in
81
question. What makes them adjudicate legal questions under an
assumption of deference is usually not the prospect of being either
disciplined or overturned by superior review: reversals upon appeal
are rare;s' and the Supreme Court's dwindling discretionary docket
generates very few opinions as it is.83 It is, therefore, mostly the con-
sciousness of hierarchy, rather than its actual frequent occurrence
(possibly with the addition of judicial risk-aversion, given the un-
certainty as to whether the Supreme Court would intervene), that
seems to make what we usually perceive as good judges submit to a
notion of Supreme Court supremacy: the idea that there is a single
court8 4 that calls the major shots, leaving for the rest of the agents
within the system the job of conforming Supreme Court directives
with the varying facts of the cases that arise8 5
79. What I call a "jurisprudence of deference" has been documented by several au-
thors. See, e.g., Ashutosh Bhagwat, Separate but Equal?: The Supreme Court, the Lower Federal
Courts, and the Nature of the "Judicial Power," 80 B.U. L. REv. 967, 973-92 (2000); Levinson,
supra note 54, at 847-48.
80. A whole normative theory of judicial decision-making based on prediction of ap-
pellate results exists. See Evan H. Caminker, Precedent and Prediction: The Forward-Looking
Aspects of Inferior Court Decisionmaking, 73 TEX. L. REv. 1 (1994). For a general critique, see
Pauline T. Kim, Lower Court Discretion, 82 N.Y.U. L. REv. 383, 436-41 (2007).
81. Cf TUSHNET, supra note 13, at 38-39.
82. See Chris Guthrie & Tracey E. George, The Futility of Appeal. Disciplinary Insights into
the "Affirmance Effect" on the United States Courts of Appeals, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 357 (2005);
Lynn M. LoPucki & Walter 0. Weyrauch, A Theory of Legal Strategy, 49 DuKE L.J. 1405, 1437-
68 (2000).
83. See Erwin Chemerinsky, The Roberts Court at Age Three, 54 WAYNE L. REV. 947, 948-
53 (2008); Kenneth W. Starr, The Supreme Court and Its Shrinking Docket: The Ghost of William
Howard Taft, 90 MiNN. L. REV. 1363, 1366-68 (2006).
84. Indeed, sometimes that single Court may be reduced even to a single justice: this
happens in the eras of the balance-tippers, such as justice Kennedy on the current Court,
andJustice O'Connor before him. See generally Lee Epstein & TonjaJacobi, Super Medians, 61
STAN. L. REv. 37 (2008).
85. See Bhagwat, sup5ra note 79, at 986 ("Because the possibility of review is, however,
extremely limited, the true force of the [Supreme] Court's precedent must lie in the voluntary,
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Of course, this kind of jurisprudence of deference is, by many
accounts, a good thing. It is said to promote stability, coherence, and
predictability in the legal order. It is understood to serve as a nor-
malizing check on judicial deviance and a legitimating guarantee
of accountability. 6 But even if one accepts the arguable force of
these rationales in most fields of "regular" law, their consequence
ought to be recognized when constitutional meanings are con-
tested: a persistent consciousness of centralizing hierarchy among
lower-level courts inhibits their transformative potential as vehicles
for meaningful deliberation, argumentation, and reflection on the
multiple meanings accommodated by constitutional language. In
many cases the central question asked by the judge-and therefore
by the attorneys pleading before the judge, and other social stake-
holders that may be backing the litigants' causes-is how did, or
how would, the Supreme Court resolve such an issue. The case
therefore no longer concerns the question of how could the law be
most productively developed in order to accommodate the social
question presented (as it does, at least per the realist account, in
the Supreme Court). The trial court-although it offers a uniquely
institutionalized venue for fleshing out social concerns through
recurrent, direct encounters between government and individ-
ual-is forced away from its potential by being regimented to think
and act hierarchically.
(2) Stakeholders. By choosing to "go to court" in order to litigate
the content or meaning of the Constitution, the relevant stake-
holders opt for a certain institutional package, which includes the
procedures, institutional culture, and outcome possibilities and
probabilities offered by a court's practices. A trial court-where
(almost) all litigations begin-which is embedded in a legal culture
captured by the supremacy of a Supreme Court, will usually offer
either adherence to its conception of what the Supreme Court dic-
tates, or, alternatively, mere access to the long march toward the
Supreme Court, where the constitutional issue in question will per-
haps be authoritatively resolved at some point in the future.
Litigants, in turn, focus their efforts on persuading the court to
follow one or another understanding of Supreme Court decrees or
good faith efforts of the lower courts to follow it. And in most cases, there seems no doubt
that federal judges do in fact make every effort to apply the Court's precedent....").
86. A reading from Critical Legal Studies would probably add that these apparent vir-
tues are in truth rhetorical tools for obscuring the ideological capture of lower-court judges,
who follow high court instruction because they share similar ideological projects, not due to
an independent professional ethos. See, e.g., DUNCAN KENNEDY, A CRITIQUE OF ADJUDICA-
TION [FIN DE SIkCLE] 236-46 (1997). As I argue infra, one need not subscribe to this




work hard to convince the trial court that either the Supreme
Court has yet to weigh in on the question at hand or that it has
signaled its intention of shifting course on a question it has already
considered. Inferior court litigation becomes a stage for parsing
Supreme Court decisions and strategizing how to play the system
governed by that Court.
(3) Appointers, vetters, and confirmers. Reducing the judicial power
to the actions of the single Supreme Court affects the processes by
which that Court, as well as the inferior courts, is comprised. As
experience clearly shows, the nomination, confirmation, and ap-
pointment process of Supreme Court justices draws significantly
more focus, interest, and effort from all parties involved, including
the media, than the much more common confirmation process for
inferior court judges. This is, of course, not surprising: Supreme
Court justices are considered the most important and most power-
fuljudges in the country. And in at least one sense they are: sitting
on the court of last resort for federal and state appeals, they have
the final word in any case or controversy that gets to be heard and
decided by them. But in a more abstract sense, the design of the
judicial appointment process seems to reflect and reaffirm the cap-
ture of the legal and political systems by a pyramidal concept of
constitutionalism: since the only constitutional determinations that
matter are made, or were made, or will be made, or could be
made, by the single Supreme Court, it is there that most capital
should be invested.
This is a misguided premise for two reasons. First, as a practical
matter, inferior courts have the opportunity to interpret and apply
the Constitution much more often that the Supreme Court does,
and they affect real lives in real contexts each and every time they
engage in constitutional adjudication. Given the residual degree of
Supreme Court intervention, these judges reflect the legal order to
most litigants most of the time. Second, as a matter of embedded
potential, inferior courts offer much more room for popular delib-
eration on the content and meaning of the Constitution through a
diffuse, diverse, localized, and pluralistic institutional setting. Lack
of political interest in the appointment of inferior court judges
means that despite these constitutionally crucial aspects of inferior
court adjudication, the process enjoys less of the democratic ac-
countability and deliberative dynamics that more visible
appointment processes garner.87
87. See generally NANCY SCHERER, SCORING POINTS: POLITICIANS, ACTIVISTS, AND THE
LOWER FEDERAL COURT APPOINTMENT PROCESS (2005) (exploring the increasing politiciza-
tion of the appointment process).
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III. THE TURN TO TRIAL COURTS: EVIDENCE OF
INSTITUTIONAL POTENTIAL
The scholarly and professional preoccupation with the Supreme
Court extends beyond the judicial review debate. It is a conse-
quence of the general pyramid-shaped assumptions held in regard
to the work of state power through legal institutions. However,
there is a unique aspect to rethinking the structure and practices
of constitutional adjudication in supreme and inferior courts. Mak-
ing constitutional law implies defining the very fabric of social life
in its national level; it involves the most fundamental questions
with which a constituency grapples: the extent of governmental
power, the meaning of rights. This is what judges and justices do
when they interpret and apply the Constitution; they do this even if
they are not always aware of it or willing to admit it. This is why the
cost of reflecting on constitutional adjudication through a dis-
torted institutional lens is so high. If indeed the practices and
characteristics of inferior courts have the institutional potential for
a new, perhaps more resolved, conceptualization of constitutional
adjudication in general and judicial review in particular, then it is
there that the focus should be directed. In this Part of the Article, I
argue that indeed there does exist the potential for trial courts to
become government-provided institutional anchors for the exer-
cise of a popularly-minded, more deliberative, more participatory,
more pluralistic-indeed, democratic-kind of constitutionalism.
Three special characteristics of inferior courts-compared to
those of high courts-contribute to their potential as novel loca-
tions of constitutional deliberation; all three derive from their
"inferiority. 88 The first characteristic is the unique structural com-
bination of professional governmental discretion with a constant,
direct contact with real-life constituents. In many respects this
combination of discretion and interaction is a result of the institu-
tional realities of the administrative state, and was essentialized by
Michael Lipsky as the concept of "street-level bureaucracy":89 gov-
ernment, redesigned as a pervasive regulator/service-provider,
employs a multitude of individual officeholders for the repetitive
determination of facts and discretionary application of rules and
policies.90 Courts, of course, preceded this (arguably) new vision of
88. See generally Susan S. Silbey, Making Sense of the Lower Courts, 6 JUST. SYs. J. 13
(1981).
89. MICHAEL LIPSKY, STREET-LEVEL BUREAUCRACY: DILEMMAS OF TIlE INDIVIDUAL IN
PUBLIC SERVICES (1980).
90. See id. at 3-4.
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the administrative state in their combination of governmental dis-
cretion and face-to-face interaction of state and individual.
The second characteristic is the relative obscurity of some trial
court activities from general awareness. Because there are so many
of them all across the country, because their adjudication processes
are relatively long, complicated, and cumbersome, because they
involve direct interaction with social pathologies (i.e., what we
would usually rather not know about), and because appellate re-
view for these and other reasons is in effect scarce-trial courts are,
to some degree, free to act away from the discerning watch of na-
tional politics and thus can and do exercise more independence,
experimentation, and local engagement.
The third characteristic is the structural diffusion of trial courts
and trial judges: Trial courts maintain physical presence through-
out the country. Following their diverse locations, they employ
diverse judges and diverse staffs, and repeatedly engage in diverse
kinds of disputes that involve diverse sorts of people. This renders
lower adjudication-to varying degrees-more localized, contex-
tual, and heterogeneous than appellate adjudication, which is
structurally centralized and institutionally expected to exert a
normalizing force on inferior deviations. Proliferation and redun-
dancy foster pluralism, innovation, and dialogue.
These three "inferiority effects"-trial courts' behavior as street-
level bureaucracies, their relative obscurity, and their structural
diffusion-support a reassessment of the role of those courts in the
constitutional process. I will now elaborate on each of these attrib-
utes and their applicability to constitutional adjudication.
A. Discretion Meets the Individual: Trial Courts as
Street-Level Bureaucracies
The concept of street-level bureaucracy was introduced by Mi-
chael Lipsky in order to capture the unique social and political
reality of a large class of public officials whose jobs combine discre-
tionary application of policy with regular interactions with those
subject to the policy-the group he termed "clients" (welfare re-
cipients, school students, criminal suspects, patients, litigants)."'
What makes this group of bureaucrats special is their capacity for
effectively making policy-sometimes in contrast to superior in-
structions, other times in accordance with principal plans. This
91. See id. at 54-65.
92. Id. at 13-18, 23-25.
SUMMER 20101
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform
capacity for localized, individualized policymaking is revealed as a
structural characteristic of the administrative state: discretion has
to be used in order to distribute scarce public resources (funds,
time, space, attention); upper echelon officials cannot track and
control each and every decision made by street-level bureaucrats in
this respect; and street-level bureaucrats face a matrix of interests
and pressures that are not fully consistent with those of policy-
makers and supervisors (namely, a need to process many clients in
conditions that do not allow for formal equity, while asserting au-
thority, and sustaining sufficient levels of production and
reputation to ensure promotion and avoid sanctions) .°
Faced with the constant need to balance routine case-processing
and individuated treatment of varying clients, street-level bureau-
crats engage in a variety of strategies, most of which are structurally
enabled by their granted discretion: they screen, interact, and de-
cide on clients' matters in ways that often involve disparate
treatment, submission to heuristics, withholding of information,
and deference to non-accountable agents.94 They exercise discre-
tion without being directly trained in this practice, and they often
are not required to stipulate the reasons for their numerous deci-
sions, many of which seemingly do not implicate formal agency
output.9 5 This institutional reality amounts to street-level policy;
and attention is so drawn to the design of modes of administrative
discretion and bureaucrat-client interaction.
It is reasonably disputable whether trial courts fall squarely
within the analytical category of "street-level bureaucracies," and,
more notably, whether trial judges fully constitute "street-level bu-
reaucrats." Lipsky himself considered courts at the heart of this
category." Subsequent opinions diverge from this viewpoint,97 and
both sides have a point. Indeed, trial courts are uniquely positioned
by being both subject to higher ordering (like other street-level bu-
reaucrats), and in charge of supervising the acts of other
bureaucratic actors-mostly in public law and criminal law litigation,
where they set policy through explicit judicial pronouncements as
well as informal institutional practices. Trial judges, protected by the
shield of judicial independence, are also subject to much fewer
93. Id. at 29-31, 45-48, 81-83.
94. Id. at 83-99, 105-11.
95. Id. at 15-16.
96. See, e.g., id. at 19-20, 30.
97. CompareJAMES Q. WILSON, BUREAUCRACY: WHAT GOVERNMENT AGENCIES Do AND
WHY THEY Do IT 290-94 (1989) ("Judges and bureaucrats see the world differently...." Id.
at 290.), with Dave Cowan & Emma Hitchings, "Pretty Boring Stuff": District Judges and Housing
Possession Proceedings, 16 Soc. & LEGAL STUD. 363, 365 (2007) ("[British DistrictJudges] are a
breed of street-level bureaucrat....").
996 [VOL. 43:4
InferiorizingJudicial Review
institutional sanctions than many other bureaucrats.98 At the same
time, contemporary trial courtjudges clearly face many of the chal-
lenges, and employ many of the strategies, that are known to be
prevalent in the work of street-level bureaucrats." Trial judges
manage vast amounts of cases, all involving a considerable degree
of interaction with litigants and attorneys, as well as other state bu-
reaucrats (public defenders, parole officers, marshals, law clerks,
bailiffs). They regularly distribute time slots, attention spans, and
degrees of interest and involvement among the various clients, in
an attempt to resolve professional, psychological, and resource-
scarcity constraints: consider, for example, the varying degrees of
formality in the interaction between judge and attorneys, the in-
volvement of the judge in witness examination, or the judge's
engagement in settlement initiatives. And although judicial systems
are designed in a uniquely disciplining structure-the principal
levels, i.e., appellate courts, supposedly exist for the single purpose
of correcting lower-level errors-the trial procedure leaves judges
with great swaths of practically unreviewed discretion (read:
power) of the kind depicted by Lipsky.
Several normative implications may be drawn from this illustra-
tion of bureaucratic discretion. One plausible response emphasizes
its democratic deficits: street-level bureaucracy is understood as a
latent mechanism of policymaking by unaccountable officials. Pol-
icy choices reached through majoritarian politics are thwarted by
the free-ranging discretion of end-point officials. Democratic will is
not executed, equality in treatment is skewed, and administrative
coherence and consistency are undermined. 0 Without laboring
the strength of this critique-suffice to recall that institutional de-
sign, and not only "substantive" policy, is also the result of
democratic decision-making-another response to the phenome-
non of street-level bureaucracy in the lower courts would focus on
the constitutionally transformative potential revealed in these insti-
tutional realities. Courts offer a unique version of the encounter
98. This claim is of course complicated in those states that elect theirjudicial officers.
Electoral scrutiny brings into play a whole new set of incentives and strategies-with both
politicizing and insulating effects. See Steven P. Croley, The Majoritarian Difficulty: Elective
Judiciaries and the Rule of Law, 62 U. CHI. L. REv. 689 (1995);Jed Handelsman Shugerman,
Fear, Filters, and Fidelity: Judicial Elections and the Making of American Tort Law (Harvard Law
Sch. Program on Risk Regulation Research Paper Series, Paper No. 08-13, 2008) (on file
with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform), available at http://ssm.com/
abstract=998625. At any rate, the institutional model envisioned in the Article concerns
appointed judiciaries.
99. For a foundational piece tracking this development in the judicial role, see Judith
Resnik, ManagerialJudges, 96 HARV. L. Rav. 374 (1982).
100. See, e.g., 3 FREIDRICH A. HAYEK, LAw, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY: THE POLITICAL
ORDER OF A FREE PEOPLE 144-45 (1979).
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between discretion (power) and the individual (agency): the mat-
ter that is negotiated or fought over is the very substance of the
prevailing "rule of law"-what legal rules mean and how they are to
be applied. Thus, as street-level bureaucrats in the welfare system
produce welfare policy by employing "bureaucratic" strategies in
the face of recipients, street-level bureaucrats in the judiciary pro-
duce "the law" through their varied interactions with constituents.
Trial judges, then, have at their disposal, and in fact often em-
ploy, a wide range of unique strategies that form a distinct mode of
governmental power and give an independent and very real mean-
ing to the institutional effects of the legal regime. This recognition
can and should lead to utilizing the trial courts' unique sphere of
legal discourse in the advancement of constitutional deliberation.
Trial courts are revealed as not merely submissive units in an au-
thoritative, top-down, error-fixing system applying a unitary "law,"
but rather as an institutionally distinct class of courts, that by its
combination of judicial discretion and civil interaction offers the
potential for popular constitutional discourse. If this "street-level
potential" is conducive to democratic vitality and constitutional
development, as I think it is, then the challenge to the institutional
designer is to realize this potential within a system that tends to
think in highly hierarchical terms. This Article offers one such way,
by conceiving of constitutional adjudication as a practice of lower
courts alone.
B. Judging in the Shadow of the Law: The Benefits of
Institutional Invisibility
Once in a while the written press discovers, and in turn reveals
to the reading public, the unnoticed existence and often prolific
work of various court units. The public interest in such reports
rests on their revelatory nature-here are courts doing something
we did not think courts usually do. '0' The structured, procedural-
ized, adversarial, case-or-controversy-based notion of "the court" is
shown to only partially convey what is really going on in the na-
tion's courtrooms and what it really means to be a judge. This
often happens when the focus turns to the practices of specialized
trial court units, created to tackle specific social concerns by way of
101. See, e.g., Leslie Eaton & Leslie Kaufman, Judges Turn Therapist in Problem-Solving
Court, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 26, 2005, at Al (domestic violence courts); Erik Eckholm, Innovative
Courts Give Some Addicts a Chance to Straighten Out, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 15, 2008, at Al (drug




jurisdictional individuation. These are sometimes tellingly called
"problem-solving courts," whose missions are evident from their
titles: drug courts, domestic violence courts, juvenile courts, mental
health courts, gun courts, and in the inner-city setting, community
and neighborhood courts."2
These trial courts are located at the bottom of most formal court
hierarchies; being of limited jurisdiction, often providing entry
points for junior judges, usually commanding the least funds,
physical resources, and prestige within the system, and regularly
adjudicating the most mundane social and economic pathologies,
they enjoy a relative obscurity from the public eye, as well as from
scholarly studies of "the courts." Because they are usually highly
fact-specific and not concerned with explicit legal interpretation,
their judicial decisions are rarely appealed, and are almost never
reviewed by the jurisdiction's highest courts.103 Their jurispru-
dence, which often consists of more action than words, is not
regularly registered as part of the common law process of develop-
ing legal doctrine. Their punitive sanctions are more varied than
the typical prison/fine options of other courts, often involving
therapeutic processes, community work, and court-monitored ar-
rangements. In many instances they seem closer to ADR methods
than to those of the typical court. Still, these are courts, to be sure:
their judges wield the authority to mobilize state power in order to
effectuate their decisions. 0 4 But they are courts that, through their
relative invisibility, enjoy a certain level of institutional independ-
ence that enables them to mold different modes of adjudication in
order to suit varying matter-specific demands. 10 5
Thus, procedures in problem-solving courts often turn into col-
laborative efforts to resolve the issues underlying the case at hand.
These efforts rely on personal networks that evolve around the
judge, and that connect attorneys (mostly prosecutors and public
defenders), law enforcers, parole officers, social workers, local ac-
tivists, and other therapeutic agents, and in turn the parties
102. Michael Doff has cast these courts as experimentalist institutions. See Michael C.
Dorf, Problem-Solving Courts and the Judicial Accountability Deficit, in PUBLIC ACCOUNTABILITY:
DESIGNS, DILEMMAS AND EXPERIENCES 301, 305-09 (Michael W. Dowdle ed., 2006).
103. In some problem-solving courts, such as many drug courts, admittance into the
therapeutic programs conducted by the court requires a waiver by the defendant of her
right to appeal. Id. at 315.
104. See Robert M. Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 YALE L.J. 1601 (1986).
105. See generally PAMELA M. CASEY & DAVID B. ROTTMAN, NAT'L CTR. FOR STATE
COURTS, PROBLEM-SOLVING COURTS: MODELS AND TRENDS (2003) (on file with the Univer-
sity of Michigan Journal of Law Reform), available at http://www.ncsconline.org/WC/
Publications/COMM ProSolProbSolvCtsPub.pdf; James L. Nolan, Jr., Redefinine Criminal
Courts: Problem-Solving and the Meaning ofJustice, 40 AM. CRAM. L. REV. 1541 (2003).
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(mostly defendants) involved in the disputes. Remedies and sanc-
tions are designed with attention to case-specific circumstances. In
place of the formalized adversarial structure that is preserved in
visible courts (including popularly visible: consider the paradig-
matic television movie scene), judging in the shadow of the law-in
the areas where hierarchical supervision and political interest are
scarce-allows for participation, discussion, and cooperation be-
tween the various stakeholders.
These courts are not, however, invisible to their respective con-
stituencies. Successful neighborhood courts become centers of
community action and mobilization through the involvement of
local leaders and the accommodation of community-particular cir-
cumstances in the dispensation of justice. Active drug courts are
capable of affecting local abuse trends through continuous track-
ing of offenders and adoption of intra-community treatment
methods as part of the sanctioning system.' 6 Community courts
can become centers for local rejuvenation and social engage-
ment."7
Can federal district courts employ the invisibility strategies of
"problem-solving courts"? It is true that there are fewer such courts
and that they typically adjudicate cases that bear a greater chance
of attracting the attention of the media, the public, and the appel-
late courts-notably, issues concerning the enforcement,
interpretation, and application of the Constitution. The system
that operates them is relatively wealthy and they garner a consider-
able amount of interest by Congressional oversight committees.' 8
And still, once in a while revelatory accounts emerge of what it is
that district courts actually do. Perhaps the best-known such ac-
count in the last several decades was Abram Chayes' recognition of
the evolving mode of federal adjudication that he termed Public
106. See Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, Drug Treatment Courts and Emergent Experi-
mentalist Government, 53 VAND. L. REv. 831 (2000).
107. See, e.g., Jeffrey Fagan & Victoria Malkin, Theorizing Community Justice Through Com-
munity Courts, 30 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 897, 924-26 (2003). Of course, such modes of "soft"
justice are exposed to a substantial set of critiques: it is feared that they entail giving up the
protections of due process; that they are bases for judicial unaccountability, tyranny, and
discrimination; and that they render democratically-prescribed laws as mere starting points
for problem-solving dynamics. See Timothy Casey, When Good Intentions Are Not Enough: Prob-
lem-Solving Courts and the Impending Crisis of Legitimacy, 57 S.M.U. L. REv. 1459, 1489-502
(2004); Eric Lane, Due Process and Problem-Solving Courts, 30 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 955 (2003).
But the force of these critiques is diminished in the present context, which is concerned
with federal courts and with a very limited slice of cases-those invoking claims of judicial
review.
108. SeeJudith Resnik, Uncovering, Disclosing, and Discovering How the Public Dimensions of
Gourt-Based Processes Are at Risk, 81 Cui.-KENr L. REv. 521,540-41 (2006).
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Law Litigation'-a redefinition of federal adjudication as a continu-
ous, collaborative, forward-looking, injunction-based, justice-driven,
process of judicial negotiation through such social minefields as
school desegregation and prison reform. A subsequent contribution
by Judith Resnik moved the focus to the partial but significant role of
the federal judge as a case-manager, whose responsibilities have been
gradually expanding to pre-trial and post-trial procedures that often
involve different modes of party-interaction and decision-making than
those employed while presiding over an actual trial."0
Even federal district courts, then, seem to retain the possibility
of developing institutional innovations that go unnoticed unless
directly heeded by a close, aggregating inspection of their prac-
tices. Although they are fewer and relatively more salient than their
state court counterparts, there are still too many district courts,
with too many cases on their dockets, for any central tracking sys-
tem to be capable of negating the benefits of (relative)
invisibility." The federal district courts are comprehensively dis-
persed across the country, and like other localized institutions, are
embedded-to varying degrees, to be sure-in the issues, profes-
sional cultures, and social and political sensibilities of the regions
in which they reside; in this respect they also resemble the invisible
state trial courts.
When it comes to the adjudication of claims for judicial review,
the relative invisibility of district court adjudication can serve as a
basis for locally-negotiated, contextually-tailored resolutions to
constitutional questions. Acting away from "center stage," as do the
various problem-solving courts in state systems, allows for more ex-
perimentation in constitutional law, since innovation and deviation
take longer to be detected and disciplined by the normalizing
forces of centralized politics (judicial and other); thus enabling
new ideas and variations to evolve and be tested. The dynamics of
109. Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REv. 1281
(1976). Building on Chayes, the continuing study of public law litigation keeps generating
more refined insights into this yet-evolving judicial practice. See, e.g., Charles F. Sabel & Wil-
liam H. Simon, Destabilization Rights: How Public Law Litigation Succeeds, 117 HARV. L. REv.
1015 (2004); Susan P. Sturm, A Normative Theory of Public Law Remedies, 79 GEO. L.J. 1355
(1991).
110. Resnik, supra note 99.
111. The ninety-four federal districts are only the initial break-down of the federal court
system. Most federal districts operate from more than one court, each located in a different
hub within the district. And, of course, most such courts inhabit more than one judge. Be-
cause practically all district trials are currently presided over by a single judge, the
institutional production of federal district courts is actually the accumulation of the work of
655 separate judgeships. Federal Judicial Center, The U.S. District Courts and the Federal
Judiciary. http://www.fjc.gov/history/courts-district.html (on file with the University of
Michigan Journal of Law Reform).
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constitutional litigation may also benefit from institutional obscu-
rity: local networks could form, and less formalized interactions
could ensue, between attorneys, judges, rights-activists, and re-
gional social actors who are directly affected by the judicial result
(these would substitute for the national pretension of amicus briefs
filed with the Supreme Court by public organizations-the high
court's version of interest-group lobbyists).
Supreme Trial Courts? The Possible Benefits of Hyper-Visibility
The previous section considered institutional invisibility-that is,
the capacity of lower-level units to shy away from the normalizing
effects of superior oversight-as a potential basis for enhancing
decisional power and promoting experimentalism in the lower
courts. At the same time, it was emphasized that in order to pro-
duce beneficial results, institutional invisibility in the trial court
level has to be complemented by local visibility to the courts' vary-
ing constituents. However, a very different institutional mechanism
may also promote values of participation, deliberation, and plural-
ism that are at the core of the current exploration: some systems
establish their highest constitutional court as a court of both first
and last resort-in essence creating a "supreme trial court."
Examples of such courts-to varying extents-are Israel's High
Court of Justice, 12 Germany's Federal Constitutional Court,"' and
South Africa's Constitutional Court." 4 These are supreme courts, in
the sense that their iterations bind all lower courts"' as well as all
other bodies of government. But they are also trial courts, because
they regularly adjudicate considerable numbers of petitions filed
112. Israel's High Court ofJustice is in truth a session rather than a separate court: the
justices of the Supreme Court sit alternately as the country's highest court of appeals and as
its single-instance court of constitutional affairs. See NAVOT, supra note 60, at 139-41; Gidi
Sapir & Daniel Statman, Religious Marriage in a Liberal State, 30 CARDOZO L. REv. 2855, 2873
n.32 (2009).
113. GRUNDGESETZ [GG] [Constitution] art. 93(1), § 4a (ER.G.); see also Alec Stone
Sweet & Jud Mathews, Proportionality Balancing and Global Constitutionalism, 47 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 72, 104 (2008).
114. See sources cited supra note 58. The U.S. Supreme Court also maintains this dual
capacity when it exercises its exclusive jurisdiction over state-state litigation. However, these
are very rare procedures, and as such have only negligible institutional significance. See supra
notes 61-62 and accompanying text.
115. In systems such as those of Germany, South Africa, and Russia, conflict may arise as
to the comparative supremacy of the constitutional court on the one hand and the highest
court of appeals on the other. These are intriguing dynamics, and may indeed shed light on
high-stakes competitions as an institutional tool for pluralizing constitutional adjudication.
See generally WOJCIECH SADURSKI, RIGHTS BEFORE COURTS: A STUDY OF CONSTITUTIONAL
COURTS IN POSTCOMMUNIST STATES OF CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE 19-25 (2008).
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and argued directly by the interested parties without the prior ren-
dering of any judgment by any other court.' 6 In the absence of the
filtering effects of two or three lengthy and costly levels of appeal
and (in some cases) the barrier of discretionary jurisdiction, su-
preme trial courts combine the public visibility of a high court with
the accessibility, immediacy, and diversity that characterize inferior
court adjudication: high court justices, usually housed in ominous
shrines, recurrently encounter real-life people with real-life consti-
tutional claims and literally decide "one case at a time."'
7
If the procedure in fact allows for very large numbers of cases to
be processed by the high court,'1 8 there is usually an organizational
arrangement that distributes adjudication among smaller panels of
justices. Indeed, federal courts of appeals in the United States sit
regularly in panels of three, unlike the familiar U.S. Supreme
Court system of en banc adjudication. This in turn creates a dis-
course among panels that produce diverse opinions and outcomes
in related cases. Of course, judicial dynamics within a single court
present a large variety of coordination mechanisms-some institu-
tional, 9 others psychological' 2-such that an institutionalized
diversity within a supreme trial court will hardly resemble that of a
diffuse grid of trial courts spread throughout a country. Still, su-
preme trial courts enjoy unique access to public awareness thanks
to their hierarchical salience. Decisions therefore more easily be-
come part of political discourse on constitutional matters.
This Article does not elaborate on the supreme trial court
model. My focus, which tracks the U.S. structure of adjudication, is
on "genuine" trial courts, with their unique hierarchical dynamics
and institutional potential. Nonetheless, it is important to recog-
nize the alternate concept of highly visible trial court adjudication.
116. See supra notes 112-14.
117. Cf CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE SU-
PREME COURT (1999) (depicting the Supreme Court's step-by-step jurisprudence of
producing holdings with limited scope).
118. The annual docket of Israel's High Court of Justice numbers over 4000 petitions,
each of which has to be reviewed by at least three justices in order to be disposed. THE
ISRAEL COURT ADMINISTRATOR, THE ISRAEL COURT SYSTEM: A SEMI-ANNUAL REPORT
1.1.08-6.30.08, at 36 (2008), http://elyonl.court.gov.il/heb/haba/1-6_2008.pdf (on file
with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform); see also Martha Minow, Constituting
Our Constitution, Constituting Ourselves: Comments on Reua Siegel's Constitutional Culture, Social
Movement Conflict and Constitutional Change, 94 CAL. L. REv. 1455, 1459 (2006).
119. For example, the option a panel holds to deferjudgment until another panel dis-
poses of a contemporaneous case. See, e.g., United States v. McQuiston, 972 F.2d 349 (6th
Cir. 1992) (unpublished table decision).
120. These are peer-pressure and panel-related strategizing effects. See Richard A. Pos-
ner, Judicial Behavior and Performance: An Economic Approach, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 1259, 1273
(2005).
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It will be again useful in a later discussion, when the applicability of
the inferiorizing model to non-U.S. constitutional regimes will be
questioned.'1'
C. Many Voices: The Pluralist Effects of Redundancy
Perhaps the most striking characteristic of the modern adminis-
trative state is its sheer physical size: not merely the multitude of
agencies and organizations maintained by the state, but even more
so their spread throughout the country in units and departments,
buildings and offices, inhabited by scores of employees. Many na-
tional agencies divide their scope of authority into regional and
local chapters, which dispense agency policy locally. From an or-
ganizational expediency perspective, this compensates for the lack
of physical capability to carry out administrative authority by a sin-
gle central body--it is obviously more efficient and less
burdensome to open Social Security offices or Veteran Administra-
tion hospitals in every urban center, than to have all of the clients
of these organizations arrive at a single center somewhere in the
country. Courts, of course, are no different, and even in its earliest
days it was understood that Supreme Court Justices would have to
"ride circuit" and bring federal law to its constituents, rather than
having them come and get it. '22
The diffuse structure of administrative agencies and court sys-
tems that emerges-many units employing local administrators
throughout the country to apply the same policies and procedures
to relevantly equal clients-raises various agency problems and
concerns of coherence and parity. Some of these have already been
touched upon, in the discussion of trial courts as street-level bu-
reaucracies.1 2 3 But institutional multiplicity and redundancy, the
costs they generate notwithstanding, may also reveal themselves as
sources of value pluralism and dialogue in the interpretation and
application of public policy or, in the case at hand, constitutional
norms.
The potential for creating new spaces of expression, exchange,
and interaction between groups and individuals of differing inter-
ests or beliefs through an institutionalized proliferation of
decisional authority has been tracked by various authors in differ-
121. See infta Part VI.D.
122. Compare, as Cover did, with the Jewish history of "the halcyon days before the de-
struction ofJerusalem, where the Great Sanhedrin sat and whence the Law went out to all
Israel." Cover, supra note 45, at 41.
123. See supra Part IIIA.
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ent contexts. Consider Robert Cover's exploration of the functions
of jurisdictional redundancy-state/state, state/federal-in the
United States (explaining the multiplicity of venues as a design
that preempts centralized capture by ideology or interest, and
promotes innovation through experimentalism and dialogue) ,24 or
Ayelet Shachar's joint governance model for the adjudication of
culturally-implicated matters in multicultural democracies (a net-
worked division of adjudicatory power among various state and
sub-state institutions, facilitating competing liberal demands of
group and individual rights, but also fostering transformative proc-
esses within and among groups through exchange of normative
visions) . 5 These and similar accounts rely on purely institutional
frameworks to identify, and in turn induce, the coexistence of di-
verse, multi-vocal normative worlds. If constitutionalism is meant to
sustain this kind of value-pluralism, then its enforcement mecha-
nism calls for the same kind of institutional diffusion.
IV. INFERIORIZING JUDICIAL REVIEW: POPULAR
CONSTITUTIONALISM IN THE TRIAL COURTS
I have argued two central propositions: (1) The most prevalent
critiques of the practice of judicial review are focused on a limited
concept of this practice as the domain of the Supreme Court.
When considering diffuse systems of judicial review, these critiques
overlook the prolific constitutional work done by trial courts. Fur-
thermore, judicial review in trial courts is susceptible to much
fewer of the critiques presented with the Supreme Court in mind.
(2) Due to their multitude of direct, recurrent encounters with
litigants, their relative institutional independence in relation to
higher courts, and their structural diffusion across regions and
populations, trial courts have a unique institutional potential for
enhancing democratic values of deliberation, participation, and
pluralism.
These two propositions serve as a basis for the following norma-
tive argument: trial courts-for the purpose of the simple model
124. Robert M. Cover, The Uses of Jurisdictional Redundancy: Interest, Ideology, and Innova-
tion, 22 WM. & MARY L. REv. 639 (1981); see also Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Specialized
Adjudication, 1990 BYU L. REv. 377, 379-80.
125. AYELET SHACHAR, MULTICULTURAL JURISDICTIONS: CULTURAL DIFFERENCES AND
WOMEN'S RIGHTS 88-145 (2001); see also CAROL WEISBROD, EMBLEMS OF PLURALISM: CUL-
TURAL DIFFERENCES AND THE STATE 149-56 (2002) (considering the proliferation of
schooling variations as a state-managed exercise in pluralism).
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explored here, these will be federal district courts_26-should be
reconstituted as the sole constitutional courts of the federal system.
This means that the power of judicial review-as defined earlier,
the power to overrule legislative acts for constitutional reasons-
would be restricted to trial courts alone. The Supreme Court
would have no power to review judicial review determinations
made by lower courts. For the sake of simplicity, the model would
also eliminate the power of federal appellate courts to review these
determinations. Clearly, the political and procedural barriers to
implementing such a (seemingly) radical shift in the decisional
power of the federal judiciary would be immense. I bracket here
these practical concerns and focus instead on the alternative insti-
tutional reality the model proposes.
This Part centers on the argument for inferiorizing judicial re-
view. I hope to show how this idea manages to combine the
contributions of popular/populist constitutionalists, who are typi-
cally suspect of judicial power, with a theory of democratic
deliberation that utilizes the very institutional potential offered by
courts.
A. Popular Constitutionalism in the Trial Courts
Many current constitutional thinkers-be they critics of (the Su-
preme-Courtian concept of) judicial review;12 7 explorers of
alternate, non-court-based modes of constitutional mobilization;
2 8
or scholars concerned with explicitly politicizing (supreme) courts,
primarily through the judicial appointment process 129-are some-
times considered to share a common theoretical category:
"popular constitutionalism." What exactly constitutes a popular
constitutionalist perspective, or theory, or argument, is not fully
126. State courts, with their complicating characteristics of judicial elections and juris-
dictional complexities, are excluded from this model. See supra note 2.
127. Most notably, see KRAMER, supra note 3; PARKER, supra note 22; TUSHNET, supra
note 13; Kramer, supra note 9.
128. E.g., Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Roe Rage: Democratic Constitutionalism and Backlash,
42 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 373 (2007); Reva B. Siegel, Dead or Alive: Originalism as Popular
Constitutionalism in Heller, 122 HARV. L. REv. 191 (2008).
129. E.g., Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, The Processes of Constitutional Change: From
Partisan Entrenchment to the National Surveillance State, 75 FORDHAM L. REv. 489 (2006); Steven
G. Calabresi &James Lindgren, Term Limits for the Supreme Court: Lfre Tenure Reconsidered, 29
HARv.J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 769 (2006); Robert Post & Reva Siegel, QuestioningJnstice: Law and
Politics in Judicial Confirmation Hearings, YALE L.J. POCKET PART 38 (2006), http://




defined,3 ° but it seems that what is essentially common to these
various points of view is the idea that constitutionalism-giving
substance and meaning to the Constitution-should not only be
effected in courts and by courts, but should also involve the mean-
ingful participation of other political spheres. The general theme
is thus to re-orientate the gaze away from "the courts," and to fo-
cus-in both descriptive and normative terms-on the
constitutional effects of non-court actors. 13
The popular constitutionalist message is, of course, conflicted.
On the one hand, it is profoundly democratic, and not merely be-
cause it seems to give more weight than other constitutionalist
theories to the choices of present majorities. Popular constitution-
alism is democratic because it is concerned with assuring that the
Constitution remains more than a formal blueprint to be handled,
interpreted, and applied only by professional experts who are of-
ten called judges; rather, it considers the Constitution as a source
for continuous self-assessment and self-determination of the con-
stituency as a whole. This is why popular constitutionalism is wary
of "courts" monopolizing the Constitution, and is encouraged by
the prospects of competing modes of public deliberation over the
meaning of the Constitution-in governmental politics, in social
movements, in elections, indeed in the proverbial city square.
On the other hand, popular constitutionalists are still constitu-
tionalists. They recognize the unique subject matter relevant to
defining the institutions of the democratic state and the relations
and interactions between political groups within the state, includ-
ing majorities and minorities; and thus they focus their inquiries
on the processes and conditions that would allow for constitution-
alism to occur, but without the inhibiting effects of court
supremacy, or court "overhang.'
3 2
The importance of the popular constitutionalist literature lies in
its direct engagement with the conflict between the democratic
130. See Mark Tushnet, Popular Constitutionalism as Political Law, 81 CHI.-KENT L. REv.
991, 999-1001 (2006) (embracing the recognition that "popular constitutionalism does not
offer crisp analytic categories" for predicting how its dynamics would play out in varying
contexts); cf. Erwin Chemerinsky, In Defense of Judicial Review: The Perils of Popular Constitu-
tionalism, 2004 U. ILL. L. REv. 673, 675-77 (criticizing the lack of "precise definition of the
concept" of popular constitutionalism).
131. This reading differs from that of Barry Friedman, who defined the common char-
acteristic of popular constitutionalist agendas as "a notion that-at least in specified
circumstances-judicial review should mirror popular views about constitutional meaning."
Barry Friedman, Mediated Popular Constitutionalism, 101 MicH. L. REv. 2596, 2598 (2003). I
understand the central thrust of popular constitutionalism to be concerned not so much
with how the Supreme Court should act, but rather with the political processes that precede,
follow, or altogether substitute judicial review.
132. SeeTusHNET, supra note 13, at 57-65.
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vision of popular deliberation and the traditional understanding of
constitutionalism. Unlike other invocations of the democratic diffi-
culty of judicial review, which could presumably be resolved by
merely relaxing the demands of the amendment procedure of Arti-
cle V, 33 popular constitutionalism-as I read it-attaches a separate
and central value to the ongoing constitutional discourse that takes
place away from the courts, whether affecting, resisting, or wholly
ignoring judicial power. The "pure" case of popular constitutional-
ism is of course a constitutional amendment, which requires the
mobilization of political action in many local and national spheres.
But the interesting-and more frequent-occurrences of popular
constitutionalism take various other shapes such as political actors
who defy judicial interpretations on constitutional grounds, institu-
tional maneuvers that aim at affecting judicial outcomes, and social
movements that seek to affect the public meaning of constitutional
norms.
The model of judicial review I offer here-the inferiorizing
model-relies on these contributions of popular constitutionalism.
At the same time, by breaking down the over-simplified notion of
"the courts" into the diverse segments that constitute the judiciary,
I try to show that there could be an important role for at least some
courts in a popular vision of constitutionalism. A judicial system
that is designed, and even more so perceived, as an institutional
"build-up" towards conclusive settlements of all constitutional
questions by "one supreme Court" is indeed a basis for inhibiting
public participation in the constitutional debate, and thus limiting
the effect of popular engagement in self-determination. In some
social contexts, these costs to democracy may outweigh the poten-
tial benefits of judicial enforcement of the Constitution. But a
judicial system reconstituted as a polycentric institutional grid, with
as many points of entry (cases) as points of departure (decisions)
in constitutional matters, might resolve these conflicting values.
The idea, then, as mentioned before, is to "take the Constitution
away from the Supreme Court." In the U.S. diffuse system of judi-
cial review, this would mean that district courts would keep
reviewing the constitutionality of legislation and retain their power
to strike down statutory provisions that are found to violate the
Constitution. These determinations of judicial review however
would not be appealable, and the Supreme Court (and, for pur-
133. Bickel's countermajoritarian difficulty seems to me to fall in this category. See
BICKEL, supra note 5. In many ways, Bruce Ackerman's constitutional moments are also
narratives of "Article V-like" mechanisms of persuading the Supreme Court that a formal
constitutional change has happened. See 1 ACKERMAN, supra note 41.
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poses of simplicity, the courts of appeals) would not have a role in
the practice of judicial review. For the purpose of this Article, the
proposed shift would be limited to constitutional adjudication in-
voking the rights-provisions of the Constitution. Let me now
explain in more detail some of the aspects of the inferiorizing
model, and what I perceive as its beneficial qualities.
B. The Inferiorizing Model: Contents and Effects
(1) Leaving things decided. Perhaps the most important point to
state at the outset is that the inferiorizing model maintains a judi-
cial role in enforcing the Constitution against majoritarian abuses,
and keeps generating judicial resolutions to constitutional dis-
putes. Each trial court, confronted with a constitutional challenge
to the validity of a piece of legislation, is authorized, as it is today,
to strike down that provision or to abstain from doing so. Exempt
from hierarchical supervision, the conscientious judge' is as-
sumed to substitute high court interpretation with the Constitution
itself as his or her source of authority. The effects of a judicial re-
view decision would be the same as the effects of a determination
of unconstitutionality by a district court under the current regime:
applicable to the parties to the dispute (interpartes). The trial court's
decision is final and enforceable--e.g., a defendant who successfully
challenges a criminal statute gets acquitted-but it does not have
the imposing force of precedent to be followed by other courts in
similar cases. The trial court's decision is also supreme, in the sense
that the legislature cannot re-legislate the statute to apply to the pre-
vailing party: the countermajonitarian effects of judicial review are
sustained, on a case-by-case basis. However this is a weak kind of su-
premacy: the statute remains in force throughout the jurisdiction,
with the exception of the prevailing party in the specific case.
(2) Post-decision dynamics. The trial court's judicial review deter-
mination is conclusive (to the parties involved); it will not be
reviewed by other courts. This means that in the judicial review
context, appeal-related strategizing is eliminated. The endowments
allotted by the trial court are the final judicial intervention in the
constitutional aspect of the dispute-the parties are free to use
them for negotiation or persuasion purposes, away from the courts.
In the absence of prospects for future reversal, the debate over the
general propriety of the statute in question, and over how other
courts should resolve it, can begin immediately. And indeed, other
134. See supra Part II.C.1.
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judges, while not obligated to follow the dictates of a fellow trial
judge, may take notice of the result reached in a similar case, as is
the habit of most judges when confronted with new or complicated
questions: they take intellectual guidance from prior resolutions of
such questions, and pose their own solutions in relation to previ-
ous ones. Without the prospect of appellate intervention, inferior
courts engage, over time, in a multi-member conversation about
the meanings of the Constitution-a conversation repeatedly re-
sumed by responsive litigants.
At the same time, political actors take notice of the courts' deci-
sions in real time: with no need to await further review by higher
courts, political action can resume swiftly. Legislators may decide to
revise a statute tainted by judicial invalidations-either mending
the apparent constitutional flaw or, just as plausibly, stressing the
majority's insistence that the act is nonetheless constitutional. In-
terest groups can engage in lobbying with the legislature to act one
way or another. Government officials will need to decide whether
to keep enforcing such a statute. At the same time, legal activists
may pursue additional litigations in order to get a more compre-
hensive sense of judicial understandings of the constitutional
question, and either reinforce or redirect the trajectory initiated by
previous decisions.
(3) Distributive consequences. Eliminating the possibility of appeal
from judicial review determinations is expected to generate an
added distributive effect of enhanced parity between the parties.
Appellate strategies are usually more available to "haves"-that is,
to litigants of financial or institutional means; and to repeat play-
ers. In the constitutional context that would normally be the
state. 135 In the context of judicial review, where the protection of
weakened, vulnerable, and under-organized groups is often at
stake, a fair allocation of strategic chips seems all the more impor-
tant.
Perhaps more profoundly, by turning trial courts into the consti-
tutional courts of the system, multiple points of access are provided
to various claimants for arguing their constitutional challenges and
generating enforceable judicial results. Because access to a trial
court is an individual right, in the public law context it approxi-
mates direct democracy and facilitates individual participation
more than any other kind of governmental procedure, including
135. See Linda R. Cohen & Matthew L. Spitzer, The Government Litigant Advantage: Impli-
cations for the Law, 28 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 391 (2000). The seminal framing of this insight is
Marc Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change, 9
LAw & Soc'y. lrv. 95 (1974).
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popular elections."G Members of silenced, disenfranchised, or un-
der-represented groups have, at least formally, equal access to trial
court adjudication as those of social, economic, and political elites.
Generating constitutional discourse at the trial court level would
ensure, at least to some degree, that members of weak groups ef-
fectively participate in generating constitutional meanings and in
accumulating lasting court victories. This is an important distinc-
tion from the departmentalist school of popular constitutionalism
(Larry Kramer being its notable figure 37) that seeks to rely on the
existing, highly structuralized institutions of political govern-
ment-President, Congress (and parties), Supreme Court-for the
sustenance of constitutional discourse. These are profoundly elitist,
remote, and quite arcane, social venues. 3 8 The work of trial courts,
on the other hand, is to hear practically anyone who comes before
them with a valid legal claim, and to do so in a relatively accessible
manner such that procedural expertise is not a necessary condition
for success.
(4) Framing. The court process makes stakeholders state their
concerns in terms of claim and answer, law and fact, right and duty,
power and privilege. It requires them to work out a narrative, and
to form legal arguments that are based in text, reason, policy, and
history. Judges are expected to determine and delineate the legal
questions that are invoked by the dispute, to distinguish them from
matters of fact, and to apply specifically relevant bodies of law. All
of these are often, and rightly, perceived as the limitations of the
legal process: its imposed binary nature, its distorted sense of truth,
its methodological and political shortcomings as narrative-
producer, its stiffening formality. But these characteristics are also
what makes the trial court such a potent vehicle of normative dis-
cussion and such a popularly attractive medium for the staging of
moral and political dilemmas. The court process frames the harsh-
est constitutional disputes in socially "usable" terms: it provides
both narrative form and clearly defined questions. Of course,
courts may err in generating both narratives and questions. But
when many courts do this in many cases over time, diversity and
redundancy serve as checks on erroneously deviant framings.
These checks will be further explored in points 8-10.
136. See Eylon & Harel, supra note 39, at 1017-21 (judicial review as a mechanism of
participatory democracy).
137. See Kramer, supra note 9, at 83; Larry Kramer, Response, 81 CHI.-KFr L. REv. 1173,
1175-76 (2006) [hereinafter Kramer, Response].
138. For a similar critique, see Christopher Tomlins, Politics, Police, Past and Present:
Larry Kramer's The People Themselves, 81 Ci.-KENT L. REv. 1007, 1015-16 (2006).
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(5) Reasoning. Judicial decisions not only frame legal issues, but
also reason about ways to resolve those issues. They explain how
and why a conclusion was reached. The two accepted explanations
as to why courts attach reasons to decisions are appealability and
accountability: as a practical matter, inferior courts need to explain
their decisions so that appellate courts are able to rationally review
them; and as a more profound democratic notion, there is a sense
that people-both the specific litigants and the general constitu-
ency-have a right to know why the court decided the way it did, to
ensure that government is acting rationally and consistently and to
allow for further deliberation on the basis of its stipulated rea-
sons.139 Of course, in a Supreme-Courtian regime of judicial review,
very few people, with the exception of appellate judges, are inter-
ested in the reasons given by district judges to their constitutional
decisions. We are all concerned with the at-most nine opinions pro-
duced by the justices of the Supreme Court. Under the
inferiorizing model, more reasons, generated by more judges, will
have to occupy the stage when a constitutional matter comes under
popular consideration. These reasons will no longer serve the ap-
pealability rationale but they will keep providing accountability.
More importantly, however, the various reasons offered by trial
judges for constitutional determinations will serve as a resource for
constitutional deliberation away from the courts. Just as judges are
competent framers, so they are fairly proficient reason-givers. They
are also persistent and versed readers of the Constitution. Popular
constitutionalism can use their contributions to enrich delibera-
tion with "ready-made" arguments and counter-arguments.
(6) Localism. In the settler society of the early United States,
courts emerged locally, in a diffuse and scattered manner, as part
of the efforts of the various communities to organize, enforce or-
der, and govern. As colonies became states, the local nature of the
courts' jurisdictional limits took on permanent form: the rules that
evolved regarding personal jurisdiction and venue attached a
court's power over a person to the locale from which he or she
came or in which he or she engaged in significant activities. The
persistence of the jury system in the United States grants the legal
process an added aspect of localism, as does the practical fact that
the presiding judge, the attorneys, and other court officers are
usually also members of the local community. All of these institu-
tional realities are shared to this day by federal district courts as
well. While the legal subject matter applied in all districts in consti-
139. See Frederick Schauer, Giving Reasons, 47 STAN. L. REv. 633 (1995) (on the notion
of giving reasons as committing).
[VOL. 43:4
InferiorizingJudicial Review
tutional matters (under federal question jurisdiction) is supposedly
the same, the cases that raise constitutional issues, the people that
invoke constitutional claims, and the juries and judges that decide
them, are all as diverse as the various regions and areas of the
country. This means that trial judges are generally understood to
be cognizant of, and often expected to be responsive to, local sen-
sibilities.
Of course, localism raises various challenges to a unitary concept
of "rule of law" (some of these challenges will be discussed in more
detail in the next Part), and accordingly one of the purposes of
appellate review is to tame the local forces that impact adjudica-
tion. Similarly, one of the basic functions of a federal law system,
superimposed on the several state systems, is to sustain a centrally-
guided, coherent normative framework that would transcend state
idiosyncrasies and give essence to the United States as a unitary
republic. But in the constitutional context of judicial review, local-
ism-reinstated by the denial of appellate review-plays an
important role in providing a variety of positions of equal initial
legitimacy to the national political debate on the meaning of the
Constitution. And, importantly, this multiplicity of positions is not
only a result of an intellectual exercise, but rather it carries a de-
mocratic significance in its representation of the constitutional
tendencies of different communities. At the same time, normative
uniformity is sustained across the country in all "regular law" cases
decided by the hierarchical federal judiciary.
(7) Multiplicity of outcomes. Under the inferiorizing model, the
court system would produce many more judicial review determina-
tions than it currently does: any such determination by a trial court
would become a final judicial utterance on the constitutional ques-
tion at hand, without the condensing and chilling effect of
conclusive Supreme Court resolution. Over time, important consti-
tutional questions would garner a series of outcomes from
different judges and different courts, each deciding the question
with the varying specifics of the various cases in mind. Political de-
liberation that follows would therefore have at its disposal not only
framed questions and explicated reasons, but also an array of pos-
sible outcomes resulting from various constitutional positions and
factual contingencies. We see a little of this even under the current
system, which allows for provisional circuit splits. But these are few
in number and especially susceptible to Supreme Court resolution.
This vision of "the courts" as speaking in more than one voice is
central to the inferiorizing model, because this is what makes the
courts a plausible vehicle for popular constitutionalism in a
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pluralist democracy. This is an important difference from Kramer's
or Friedman's accounts of popular constitutionalism, or indeed
from Bickel's Court as reflector and prophet, or from Ackerman's
structure of constitutional revolutions-all of which track respon-
siveness modes between popular politics and the extremely sparse
utterances offered by the Supreme Court over time on any given
controversy. The vision of the inferiorizing model is of a continu-
ing political discussion on the meanings of the Constitution, which
is infused with gradually accumulating judicial opinions, composed
in trial courts across the country. A multiplicity of outcomes on
similar questions can be exhibited in diversity, contradiction, or
convergence. The next three points explore these different plural-
izing effects.
(8) Diversity. Perhaps the most interesting and important effect
of the inferiorizing model is the potential it opens for different
interpretations of the Constitution to coexist as fully applicable,
final and enforceable judicial decisions. These need not necessarily
contradict each other in any given case; they may instead represent
different visions of the Constitution, of a constitutional provision,
or of how the Constitution should be interpreted. Of course, judi-
cial interpretations of the Constitution are already diverse today-
they are the basis for the unthreatening notion of "percolation," in
which the Supreme Court lets an unresolved issue be repeatedly
contested over time in the district and appellate courts before
granting certiorari in a representative case and attempting to re-
solve the dispute once and for all. 4° But the diversity of judicial
opinions under the inferiorizing model is of course different: here
the diverse decisions of the inferior courts in the field of judicial
review remain the final outputs of the judicial system.
This is a core aspect of the inferiorizing model. It reflects a view
that that there is no single, static "correct" interpretation to many
constitutional provisions-in the absence of an available constitu-
tional instruction by the People, there is no externally valid
criterion to choose between an originalist interpretation and a
purposive interpretation, nor between views that regard privacy as
inherent to liberty or as a wholly distinct right, enumerated or oth-
erwise."' While courts would keep investigating these questions
and enforcing constitutional rights through the responses they give
to these questions, they would no longer retain the institutional
140. See Bhagwat, supra note 79, at 979-81 & nn.67-72.
141. This does not mean that any interpretation is necessarily valid: even under the in-
feriorizing model, logic, rationality, and Article V remain powerful measures of legitimacy.
See infra Part V.C.
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power to limit the number of available answers to only a single one.
The inferiorizing model diversifies the appearances of the Consti-
tution, because the Constitution has diverse meanings. In that
142sense it remains truer to the nature of any constitutional regime.
Diversity, however, does not preclude settlement of contentious con-
stitutional questions; it just limits the role of the courts in reaching
such a settlement. That power is left with the political processes of
deliberation and decision-making, animated by either conscious
agreement or indeed the dynamics of path dependency.4 3
(9) Contradictions. A special case of diversity is judicial opinions
that flatly contradict each other. One court strikes down a statute,
another court upholds it; one court identifies an unenumerated
right, another court denies its existence. This of course happens
regularly under the current regime, but today there is the possibil-
ity of unifying appellate review: the Supreme Court will tell us
eventually which answer prevails. The normalizing effect of Su-
preme Court resolution seems to promote interests of fairness and
predictability in the administration of constitutional claims that are
implicated by diverse trial court adjudication (more on these
later). But it also helps to conceal possibly important tensions, un-
certainties, and indeed contradictions in the very statutory or
constitutional matter that is under review. Contradictions in judi-
cial opinions are a useful signal to political actors that the statute
under review is "problematic," that it needs more work in order to
achieve greater clarity or to embody a more effective bargain. And
an absence of a normalizing appellate prospect means that the re-
vealed problems are here to stay, unless the agents of popular
constitutionalism engage in re-defining action.
(10) Convergence. Of the multitude of (final) results that the in-
feriorizing model generates, some would obviously be the same.
While today trial and appellate courts may also-and often do-
decide similar cases similarly over time, inferior courts have the
option of deferring decision until a pending appeal is decided by a
court of appeals or the Supreme Court. The inferiorizing model
eliminates this option in judicial review determinations. Instead, it
seeks to utilize the redundant effect of trial-court adjudication as a
resource that informs political deliberation. Thus, for example, a
large number of courts from various regions deciding similar cases
similarly should be understood as signaling to political actors a
widespread agreement among judges on the given constitutional
142. SeeA-manda Frost, Oveivaluivg Unifarmily, 94 VA. L. REV. 1567 (2008).
143. See infra Part VA
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question.' This does not mean that the political actors need nec-
essarily follow apparent agreements among courts; but, as in other
systems of weak-form judicial review, the political burden of per-
suasion would shift to those political or judicial actors who keep
objecting to the evolving constitutional consensus.
C. The Inferiorizing Model: A Summary
The vision of the inferiorizing model looks, therefore, like this:
free from the prospects of the normalizing effects of appellate re-
view, constitutional adjudication in trial courts becomes but one of
several social modes of deliberation, persuasion, and decision-
making concerning the content and meaning of the Constitution.
While the courts keep deciding specific claims for judicial review,
thus enforcing constitutional rights on a (literally) case-by-case basis,
they no longer conclusively settle all constitutional disagreements;
rather they take part-employing their unique political insularity
and institutional expertise in framing and reasoning-in the process
of identifying and formulating constitutional questions, and their
possible answers, for the benefit of further deliberation and resolu-
tion through the political mechanisms of popular constitutionalism.
The model signals to judges that experimentalism will not be
penalized and to litigants that the stakes at trial are as high as they
go (no more, no less), and therefore encourages experimentation
in litigation strategy, as well as continuing public engagement even
after a court has spoken. It promotes mobilization and participa-
tion, in and out of court, because local action can engender local
change, either by harnessing the power of local courts, or by op-
posing it. Over time, ifjudicial outcomes aggregate consistently, or
if political actors are mobilized to resolve judicial contradictions,
local movements can also effect more-than-local change.
The constitutional game will no longer be mainly concerned
with how to reach the Supreme Court (or whom to appoint to the
Court) and make it decide "correctly." Instead, it becomes a series
of consecutive battles that generate social and political effects-
constitutional meanings-through recurrent judicial determina-
tions, the responses they evoke in the political sphere, and, in turn,
further decisions by responsive courts. In a sense, this is a populist
version of constitutional dialogue models: not between Supreme
144. A notable convergence of inferior courts materialized around the scope of the Sec-
ond Amendment to keep and bear arms, until the Supreme Court reversed course. See
District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2823 & n.2 (2008) (Stevens,J., dissenting).
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Courts, legislatures, and Presidents; but between localized courts
and varied political constituencies. The trial court, as a universal
point of access for individuals with grievances, ensures that popular
constitutionalism remains genuinely popular, and not captured
wholly by the distancing (and historically often disenfranchising)
constitutional politics of governmental departments.
1 45
The model ofjudicial review by trial courts renders the Constitu-
tion more local, accessible, and malleable. It accepts redundancy,
conflict, and pluralism as essentials of moral argument, which is
the kind of argument we engage in when trying to give meaning to
most rights clauses. It embraces diversity and contradictions-the
possibility of indeterminacy-in the meanings of constitutional
provisions over space and time, locations and contexts. It allows for
more than one meaning to hold simultaneous effect, because in a
pluralist democracy there is no objectively (i.e., supra-political) sin-
gle, static, "correct" meaning of such standards as "freedom of
speech," "due process," "cruel and unusual," or "equal protec-
tion.' 46 And, more importantly, a fractured normative reality is the
basis for more deliberatively democratic processes of arguing about
values.
Do We Already Have an Inferiorized System?
Although inferiorizing judicial review sounds like a radical shift
from current conditions, it is arguable that the Supreme Court of
the last two decades has, in effect, exercised an "inferiorizing" case-
management policy: with its dwindling docket of published opin-
ions and the evolving doctrine of percolation, the Supreme Court
can be understood to be effectively deferring-at least for certain
periods of time, and at least with regard to certain kinds of cases-
to diffuse inferior court adjudication. Thus, some issues are regu-
larly revisited by the Supreme Court, signaling a continuing
interest in centralizing their judicial treatment: consider the
Court's assiduous investment in the regulation of punitive dam-
ages, Fourth Amendment protections, or even (though to a lesser
degree) abortion rights. At the same time, other topics are treated
with Thayerian deference, being consistently denied access to the
Supreme Court (by way of denial of certiorari), in effect leaving
the normative field open for diverse inferior court regulation.
145. See Tomlins, supra note 138, at 1014-21 (surveying the popular deficits of institu-
tionalized politics, which complicate visions of departmentalist popular constitutionalism).
146. See Hutchinson, supra note 12, at 58-61.
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A timely example here is the question of the people's right to
keep and bear arms under the Second Amendment. In this case, the
Supreme Court had for decades shied away from providing a con-
clusive instruction as to the scope of the right-individual or
collective-allowing district and circuit courts to diffusely grapple
with the issue,'47 until it famously re-engaged with the matter in the
October 2007 term by striking down a D.C. gun-control statute. 4 '
Whatever the reason for the Supreme Court's persistent inaction-it
had ample opportunity to weigh in on the question earlier' -for a
while it did generate the sort of ground-level political dynamics envi-
sioned by the inferiorizing model: example cases challenging
various gun-control acts attracted local, and gradually national, at-
tention; federal judges with diverse political affiliations, presiding
over federal courts in different regions of the country, developed
various doctrinal tools to deal with the enigmatic language of the
Second Amendment and with its application to the changing reali-
ties of firearm production and use (notably, most courts converged
in upholding most gun-control statutes5°); and these legal and extra-
legal dynamics defined and enlivened the social movements that
have been waging the gun rights/gun control culture war. Indeed,
one way to explain the decades-long pause in the Supreme Court's
Second Amendment jurisprudence, is that the Court had been
"waiting" for the hermeneutic resources it required to evolve
through the politics of gun rights, in order for the Court to finally
interject and rediscover an "original" meaning to the Second
Amendment that suits its political makeup."'
There are a few interesting points worth noting about the gun-
control inferiorizing experiment:
The skies did not fall. For more than 60 years the Supreme Court
refrained from offering guidance on a constitutional matter that is
147. For a brief account, see MARK V. TUSHNET, OUT OF RANGE: WHY THE CONSTITU-
TION CAN'T END THE BATTLE OVER GUNS 57-67 (2007). See also ROBERT J. SPITZER, THE
RIGHT TO BEAR ARMS: RIGHTS AND LIBERTIES UNDER THE LAW 35-41 (2001).
148. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783. A similar challenge to a non-federal statute, the Chicago
gun control law, was heard by the Court on March 2, 2010, and is pending decision. Nat'l
Rifle Ass'n of Am., Inc. v. City of Chi., 567 F.3d 856 (7th Cir. 2009), cert. granted sub nom.
McDonald v. City of Chi., 130 S. Ct. 48 (2009).
149. See, e.g., Silveira v. Lockyer, 312 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 540 U.S.
1046 (2003); Quilici v. Vill. of Morton Grove, 695 F.2d 261 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 464
U.S. 863 (1983).
150. See SPITZER, supra note 147, at 38-40.
151. This explanation derives from Siegel, supra note 128. See also Sanford Levinson, The
Embarrussing Second Amendment, 99 YAL LJ. 637, 642 (1989) (exploring "what is sometimes
called the 'politics of interpretation,' that is, the factors that explain why one or another
approach will appeal to certain analysts at certain times, while other analysts, or times, will
favor quite different approaches").
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of considerable importance to many people, and yet the Constitu-
tion, and the Court, and organized society, are all still here, pretty
much intact. Instead of Supreme Court action, what we got was a
long and lively debate in the various avenues of political action
about what it means for a nation to invoke a constitutional right to
keep and bear arms. This will be worth remembering when we as-
sess more closely some of the objections to the inferiorizing model,
in the next Part.
Still, overhang persists. While the Second Amendment story pro-
vides us with a useful, and quite promising, experience of the
effects of inferiorizing judicial review, it also exemplifies the draw-
backs of leaving the Supreme Court in the picture, even in the
minimal-and minimalist, as the Heller opinion turned out to
be"'52-capacity of a scarce arbiter of protracted disagreements: al-
though the Supreme Court did not intervene in the discussion for
a long while, the possibility that it would intervene was always there,
and indeed eventually materialized. Because there is no way of
knowing if and when the Supreme Court might decide to inter-
vene in an ongoing debate, the various agents involved (lower-
court judges, parties, social movements, and political actors) must
always act on at least two registers: they need to wage the various
local battles (in and out of court), while at the same time strategiz-
ing for the possibility of Supreme Court review, which in a single
decision could divert the discussion in a whole new direction. To
use Mark Tushnet's terminology, this is an intrajudicial case of
high-court "overhang,"153 which is exacerbated by the element of
uncertainty. Not knowing whether, when, and how the Supreme
Court might intervene leads to wasteful costs, both material and
political, in preparing for various contingencies, in fighting over
the Court's makeup, and in diverting resources from the political
battlegrounds, where an issue such as the right to bear arms should
be deliberated.
No dwindling in the Court's judicial review docket. Finally, judicial re-
view is one of the fields in which the Supreme Court has increased
its involvement over the past two decades. The Rehnquist Court is
famous for striking down more federal statutes than any previous
Court-it is responsible for about a quarter of all such acts in the
history of the Supreme Court; 54 and the Roberts Court seems to be
152. See Cass R. Sunstein, Second Amendment Minimalism: Heller as Griswold, 122 HARV.
L. REv. 246, 267-69 (2008).
153. TUSHNET, supra note 13, at 57-65.
154. See Jed Handelsman Shugerman, A Six-Three Rule: Reviving Consensus and Deference
on the Supreme Court, 37 GA. L. REv. 893, 893 (2003).
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following suit.5 5 The Court's intensifying practice ofjudicial review
is conspicuous in contrast to its overall dwindling docket of pub-
lished opinions. Thus, to the extent that the Supreme Court's
diminishing docket might serve to foster inferiorizing experiments,
it seems that judicial review-the field in which I argue inferioriz-
ing is most pertinent-is an area where such experiments are less
likely.
Therefore, although we might already encounter instances of
the inferiorizing effect in various constitutional contexts, the call
for a full institutional shift still stands. And, like most other popu-
list visions of constitutionalism, the inferiorizing model of judicial
review is bound to raise several forceful objections. In the next
Part, I present the strongest of these objections and try to respond.
V. THE CENTRAL OBJECTIONS TO THE INFERIORIZING MODEL
I see three central kinds of objections that could be raised
against the call for relegating judicial review to trial courts alone,
which in the United States means to the federal district courts.
These objections concern the risks that arise out of a disruption of
the constitutional norm; the added costs and diminished efficiency
that could arise out of strategizing and forum-shopping; and the
inequity that could result from treating similar cases differently. I
agree that some aspects of all three objections have certain merit.
But I will try to show that the inferiorizing model is superior to the
model ofjudicial review as currently practiced in the United States,
even given these objections. Let us consider each in detail.
A. Rule of Law: Disruption of the Constitutional Norm
1. Anarchy
The fairly obscure, though not uncommon, argument here is
that giving up central control over the interpretation and applica-
tion of the Constitution in judicial review cases would lead to social
and moral anarchy. "The courts" would no longer serve as settlers
of the normative order, and fractured constitutional meaning
155. See, e.g., Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010) (striking
down a provision of the McCain-Feingold Act); District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct.
2783 (2008) (striking down a D.C. gun control statute); Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723
(2008) (striking down a provision of the Military Commissions Act of 2006).
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would be handed (according to some accounts, handed back156) to
the control of violent mobs enforcing a "might is right" kind of
constitutionalism.
Previous authors of popular constitutionalist visions have faced
this kind of objection and offered what seem to me persuasive an-
swers. The gist of the reply being, as Mark Tushnet put it, that
"[p]eople in organized societies tolerate a fair amount of uncer-
tainty on some questions as long as there is sufficient stability on
other matters." 57 While constitutional meaning may be expected to
lose some of its potential certainty in some areas, it is still a mecha-
nism of constitutionalism, with all that this concept bears in terms of
modes of reasoning, forms of social engagement, and dynamics of
path-dependency.' 58 At the same time it is merely a mechanism of
constitutionalism. It gives institutional effect to the normative real-
ity of pluralist democracies: the absence of a-priori and/or
consensual meanings to the moral standards set by the Constitu-
tion. The model does not intervene in the modes of "regular"
lawmaking55  and law-applying, which normally provide the
grounds for social order in a democracy.
In addition, it is important to remember that the inferiorizing
model sustains a highly institutionalized process of constitutional
deliberation-courts, with their formalizing procedures and organ-
izational culture, keep a central role in generating constitutional
meanings. This should reassure those wary of popular energy as a
driving force of constitutionalism.
2. Loss of Legal Certainty
By eliminating the prospect of conclusive Supreme Court set-
tlement to a generalizable constitutional question, the inferiorizing
model does allow for an added loss of predictability and certainty
in the content of constitutional norms. Simply put, the fact that
one court finds a statute unconstitutional would not mean that an-
other court would do the same, and so greater uncertainty is
injected into the system of norms: individuals cannot be fully
156. See KRAMER, supra note 3, at 27-28, 168; see also Larry Alexander & Lawrence B.
Solum, Popular? Constitutionalism?, 118 HARV. L. REv. 1594, 1636-37 (2005) (book review)
(critiquing Kramer).
157. Tushnet, supra note 130, at 1001.
158. I agree with Larry Kramer: "Few of us can break completely free from the intellec-
tual framework we've inherited for determining what is or isn't constitutional; even if a
handful or prophets can do so, arguments that are too far outside the box will not persuade
others." Kramer, Response, supra note 137, at 1181.
159. See 1 AcKERMAN, supra note 41, at 6.
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certain of the legality or illegality of their acts, since a future court
may happen to resolve these questions in an unexpected way, with-
out the prospect of normalizing appellate review. Similarly, a state
official cannot know for sure, simply by following the available ju-
dicial signals, whether a statute he or she is applying or enforcing
will be upheld in court the next time it is challenged there. Diverse
judicial pronouncements on constitutional issues across jurisdic-
tions may also generate a chilling effect: consider two states with
similar regulations of on-line speech, in cases where state A's stat-
ute is struck down by its relevant district court and state B's statute
is upheld by another court. Lacking the capacity to direct different
kinds of content to the different states, a website is likely to submit
to the restrictive regime upheld in state B, in essence foregoing the
benefits of the constitutional result achieved in state A.
I agree that loss of legal certainty and predictability is a cost to
be reckoned with. I believe it is worth accepting this cost for the
other benefits of the inferiorizing model. But I would like to ques-
tion the force of the certainty objection, on two grounds:
(1) Less certainty? The first thing to note is that the Supreme-
Courtian model of judicial review frequently leaves many issues
unresolved and therefore unaccommodating of concerns of uni-
formity and certainty. There is no need here to state a general
claim about the indeterminacy of legal rules-although it is usually
true, and most of all in constitutional rules (consider the vast
amounts of uncertainty left for future deliberation after the Su-
preme Court has supposedly resolved such core questions as the
constitutionality of racial segregation or the scope of the right to
bear arms). Suffice to cite such accounts as Cass Sunstein's descrip-
tive model of the Supreme Court's judicial minimalism, by which it
decides one case at a time while avoiding general pronounce-
ments;"O or indeed the fact that under the certiorari rule, the
Court decides a mere fraction of the cases brought before it, and
not all of the denied petitions lack the potential to settle some as-
pect of a constitutional dispute.
(2) Possibility of resolution. More importantly, the inferiorizing
model does not necessarily undermine the possibility of a clear
resolution to a constitutional question. Rather, like other visions of
popular constitutionalism, it merely questions the centralized
model of judicial review as the sole and supreme way for a democ-
racy like the United States to arrive at such a resolution. Popular
constitutionalism is about identifying and designing deliberative
160. See Cass R. Sunstein, The Supreme Cowl, 1995 Term-Foreword: Leaving Things Unde-
cided, 110 HARV. L. REv. 4 (1996).
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mechanisms that could generate constitutional meanings without
the inhibiting force of centralized judicial supremacy. Thus, clear
resolution can occur, for example, when all trial courts reach a
solid and lasting consensus on a constitutional question; or when
the government chooses to revise its position on a given matter as a
response to signals of unconstitutionality from various district
courts; or when the government consistently defies such judicial
signals, eventually getting the courts to back down and stop pursu-
ing an issue; or when a political movement manages to persuade
parties to cease litigating a certain kind of constitutional issue in
the courts. The existing "decision-making" mechanisms of popular
constitutionalism are still being explored, and new ones are sure to
evolve; the important point is that centralized adjudication is not a
necessary condition for the achievement of resolution.
Under the inferiorizing model some constitutional questions
will remain unresolved. While certainty and predictability are ar-
guably important virtues of legal norms, it is worth giving them up
in some measure for the benefits that accrue from openly deliber-
ating our disagreements on the most profound aspects of social
life.
3. Loss ofJudicial Coherence and Consistency
The inferiorizing model introduces a fractured image of "the
law" in the field of judicial review of legislative acts. It substitutes
the highly-centralized image of court hierarchy with a diffuse, re-
dundant, and varied concept of judicial output. Losing the power
to say definitively "what the law is" may affect the way constituents
perceive "the courts," possibly inducing a decline in respect for
courts, judges, and their decisions, and thus in the democratizing
notion of "rule-of-law."
I doubt whether revealing the inconsistencies ofjudicial interpre-
tation would harm the social stature of courts: exhibiting the reality
of irreconcilable understandings of moral standards could and
should be a respect-worthy venture; and it is practiced daily with the
inclusion of dissenting opinions in the decisions of the Supreme
Court and the Courts of Appeals. But the more important point
made here is to remind us that the inferiorizing model concerns
only judicial review determinations. It does not destroy the core py-
ramidal functions of courts systems, which are concerned with all
other sorts of legal questions. What is special about countermajori-
tarian constitutional claims, however, is that these are issues that go
to the very essence of the social order, and as such should be
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provided with a more robust institutional setting. A central aspect
of any such institutional setting should include, I argue, a multi-
tude of localized arguments and determinations, aggregated over
time and in democratic fashion, towards a conclusive meaning of
the Constitution. The inferiorizing model, limited to matters of
constitutional review, is thus an elevating mode of judicial en-
gagement: it calls for a multiplicity of courts rather than a single
court, with engagement ongoing over time rather than in a single
episode, to substantively weigh in on a polity's defining questions.
4. Disruption of National Cohesion
According to many accounts of constitutionalism, constitutions
are not only documents of normative effect; they are also vehicles
of national self-determination and sources of public identification.
This has been termed the "symbolic" function of constitutions,161 or
their "expressive" effect.162 These are of course debatable premises:
one may question the assertion that constitutions in fact reflect na-
tional identity and serve as binders of national cohesion, 63 and
possibly more importantly, one could doubt whether constitutions
ought to serve these purposes. Still, there are good reasons to ac-
cept these views, and assuming one does, they can invoke an
objection to the inferiorizing model from the perspective of na-
tional cohesion: if the meanings of various constitutional norms
are up for tender through diverse judicial iterations and constant
political debate, then the Constitution will lose its force as a source
of moral identification for members of the polity.
Again, inferiorizing judicial review is bound to have some frag-
mentary effect on the cohesiveness of constitutional norms and
this might impair the unitary symbolic function of the Constitu-
tion. But a unitary, centralized conception of the Constitution-a
formal text susceptible to conclusive interpretation by a single in-
stitution-offers a very thin version of how constitutionalism can
play a role in defining and embodying the national ethos. In a plu-
ralist democracy that is to sustain various visions of the good, an
institutionalized diffraction of the Constitution-through the infe-
riorizing model, for example-provides diverse constituents with a
foundational body of norms on which all can reasonably disagree,
161. See Dieter Grimm, Integration by Constitution, 3 INT'L J. CONST. L. 193, 194-98
(2005).
162. See Mark Tushnet, The Possibilities of Comparative Constitutional Law, 108 YALE L.J.
1225, 1228 (1999).
163. For a comparative-based skepticism of this point, see id. at 1269-74.
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and even garner (some) effective judicial support for their diverging
positions. Institutionalized heterogeneity, rather than homogeneity,
is the ethos depicted by the constitutional system, and this is cer-
tainly a truer image of most contemporary democracies.
There are two more points to be made on the national cohesion
argument: First, the inferiorizing model makes no argument
against the preservation of the existing constitutional text-the
Constitution is still out there, with its timeless pronouncement "We
the People," its solemn guarantees of liberty, freedom of speech,
equal treatment, abolition of slavery, and broad enfranchisement.
Inasmuch as the constitutional text in itself bears a symbolic effect,
then that effect remains. Second, the inferiorizing model perceives
individual participation and local mobilization as cornerstones of
popular constitutionalism-these are enabled through the rela-
tively easy access to constitutional litigation in the trial courts. At
the same time, participation-the power to affect the meaning of
the Constitution through legal engagement-is also a mode of en-
gaging in a shared project. Constitutional meaning becomes the
result of multiple civic engagements in moral and political dis-
course, and the Constitution becomes an apparatus that more
closely "belongs" to the various constituents that took part in bring-
ing it to court.
B. Forum Shopping, Abuse, and Other Costs
A different set of objections to the inferiorizing model invokes
the familiar concerns about strategizing and forum shopping: once
one allows for diverse judicial results, one is bound to confront so-
phisticated parties who would plot their litigation strategies so as to
reach specific judges or certain districts where a favorable outcome
might be expected. This, arguably, would contravene the model's
purposes of fostering deliberative and participatory constitutional
politics through multiple localized litigations; would expose courts,
districts, and judges to exogenous incentives; and would produce
wasteful costs to parties and to courts. Let us explore in more de-
tail these projections; I consider most of them to be resolvable.
1. Subverting Diversity
Forum shopping can play out in various ways: (1) Claimants,
who initiate civil procedures challenging the constitutionality of a
certain act, may try to direct their actions or draft their claims in
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ways that would lead them to supposedly favorable courts, through
the use of personal jurisdiction or venue rules. (2) In criminal,
immigration, and some administrative cases, the government is the
instigator of the proceeding, and it could work to get the case to a
court that tends to uphold the constitutionality of a controversial
statute.' 4 (3) The legislature that produces the law in the first place
can include a jurisdictional determination, limiting all litigation
over the act to a jurisdiction that is expected to support the act
more often than not.
16 5
As has been recognized by many other authors, forum shopping
in itself is not necessarily a bad thing. It is bad only if it leads to so-
cially bad results.1 66 What constitutes "socially bad results" depends
on the stakes and interests one seeks to protect or promote. In the
context of the inferiorizing model of judicial review, forum shop-
ping is not a bad thing, as long as it does not preclude the
potential of diverse judicial outcomes over time and across locales.
When it comes to judicial review of state legislation, these risks are
inherently reduced because state statutes are reviewed by the dis-
trict courts that reside in the various states, with little possibility of
avoiding the cumulative localized effect of inferiorized constitu-
tional adjudication: different courts will review similar statutes in
different states (consider, for example, the multiple statutes con-
cerning gun control, abortion, or the death penalty). Challenges to
the constitutionality of federal legislation, on the other hand, can
be strategically invoked-or avoided-because federal statutes
normally have national effect and may be litigated in different ar-
eas of the country. The risk in the present context, therefore, is of
"strategic centralization": litigants may override the risks and bene-
fits of diversity by channeling all judicial review of a certain piece
of legislation to a certain court or a bundle of ideologically similar
courts.
Let me offer three rejoinders to this objection:
(1) Not all litigants want the same outcome. Forum shopping gener-
ates a centralizing risk only if most litigants in fact "shop" for the
164. See, e.g., Nita Ghei & Francesco Parisi, Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard in Forum
Shopping: Conflicts Law as Spontaneous Order, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 1367, 1367-68 & n.2
(2004).
165. Legislative choice of forum is common in the United States. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C.
§ 2278a-3(b) (2006) (District Court for the District of Columbia); 20 U.S.C. § 80q-2 (2006)
(District Court for the Southern District of New York).
166. See, e.g., Mary Garvey Algero, In Defense of Forum Shopping: A Realistic Look at Selecting




same forum. But in morally and ideologically contentious issues-
the kinds of issues we usually fight about when invoking judicial
review-there are usually bound to be various stakeholders and
interest groups pulling in different ways. Different groups have dif-
ferent views on how much religion government is allowed to
endorse without violating the First Amendment, or on which kind
of procedure revokes the privacy-based right to have an abortion. If
different forums are understood to promote these varying visions
of the Constitution, then the diversity of outcomes will exist not-
withstanding forum shopping.
(2) Worst case: de facto centralization. In those cases in which liti-
gants would manage to strategically centralize a constitutional
litigation by means of forum shopping, what we would get is some-
thing that is very similar to the presently existing arrangement of
adjudication: an institutional design that leads to centralized reso-
lution of constitutional questions by a single court. The only
difference would be that rather than a supreme court, it would be
a district court deciding the question. A central premise of this Ar-
ticle is that Supreme Court justices are not, and in any case should
not be, better adjudicators of constitutional norms than district
court judges. Assuming both groups go through rigorous selection,
nomination, and confirmation processes-as they could and
should-there is no self-evident reason for us to prefer the consti-
tutional interpretations of justices over those of judges. One
obvious institutional difference-justices adjudicate in panels of
nine while judges usually adjudicate on their own-is remediable
to some extent, since district courts can also sit in panels, if they so
choose. 67 The central point here is that we already have a centraliz-
ing system of judicial review, with its varying ideological
idiosyncrasies, and so centralization by way of forum shopping
would, at worst, bring us to familiar ground, no more.
(3) We have some good ways of preventing most forum shopping. Con-
sider the three forum shopping scenarios presented above. The
first two, which are the most paradigmatic-forum shopping by
individual civil claimants and by individual law enforcers-can be
effectively dealt with through vigorous enforcement of the avail-
able doctrines of personal jurisdiction and, even more so, venue.168
167. This was actually standard practice in judicial review cases until the 1970s. See, e.g.,
Abele v. Markle, 351 F. Supp. 224 (D. Conn. 1972) (striking down, by a 2-1 majority, Con-
necticut's anti-abortion statute). In addition, in a Supreme Court that is controlled, for
many practical purposes, by a single swing-vote justice, the advantages of a multi-member
panel are often limited. See supra note 84.
168. See Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Exorcising the Evil of Forminnhopping,
80 CORNELL L. REv. 1507 (1995).
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Courts will have to learn to determine more clearly and more con-
sistently which cases they should decide and which belong to other
courts. And the Supreme Court will be able to coherently instruct
them in this endeavor: determinations of jurisdiction or venue,
unlike those of judicial review, are not inferiorized in this model.
Indeed, the Court's historic insistence that personal jurisdiction is
a matter of constitutional import may receive a new and invigo-
rated meaning: it is important where you litigate your case not
merely because the other party has due process-related conven-
ience and reliance interests; but because we-the polity of this
constitutional democracy-have an interest in an institutionalized
diversity of constitutional adjudications.
The real concern, then, is with ex-ante preclusion of jurisdic-
tional diversity by the lawmaker: a Congressional statute that either
chooses an exclusive forum, or leaves the choice of forum to a gov-
ernmental body other than the courts. Thus, for example, a statute
instituting some sort of religion-related obligation could limit any
ensuing litigation to a jurisdiction that is expected, more often
than not, to uphold the statute in face of First Amendment chal-
lenges. This is a serious concern. Its resolution lies with the
practical mechanisms that would need to be instituted in order to
put the inferiorizing model into effect, and the degree of oversight
they would provide over legislative abuse. The inferiorizing model,
as a pure argument for institutional design, does not provide an
answer.
2. Efficiency Deficit
A more generic forum shopping argument highlights the excess
costs incurred by litigants in the process of strategizing and by ju-
risdictions in self-aggrandizing attempts to attract the most
litigation: in the absence of the prospect of centralizing appellate
review, parties would exert wasteful expenses in seeking the most
favorable trial court and in getting their cases to that court; and
the jurisprudence of courts would evolve through a political popu-
larity context rather than by way of methodical reasoning. Both are
reasonable risks (although in the federal judiciary, which would
still be a unified institutional entity, competition between district
courts seems less likely--or at least likely to be less intense-than
the competition between state legal systems over certain kinds of
litigation, e.g., corporate governance). But, as explained above,
both can be significantly moderated by the meaningful enforce-
ment of the rules of personal jurisdiction and venue. And it is here
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that the capacity of the Supreme Court to provide centralized over-
sight is clearly valuable: by making trial courts follow these rules,
the Supreme Court can assure that the practice of judicial review
by district courts does not involve too many forum-shopping-
related social costs.
3. Abuse of Localism
A different concern related to strategizing focuses on the incen-
tives of trial judges, who would be handed the conclusive power to
interpret the Constitution under the inferiorizing model. The con-
cern here is that districtjudges are too closely associated-politically,
socially, financially-with the political elites in the region of their
jurisdiction, and therefore would be overly reluctant to strike down
legislation passed by their peers. This objection assumes, then, that
Supreme Court justices are more insulated from parochial pressures
than district court judges, and are therefore more likely to enforce
the Constitution vigorously, regardless of the localized interests in-
volved. This applies only to judicial review of state legislation, as
federal laws originate in Washington, D.C., that is, from the very cir-
cle of elites to which the Supreme Court justices clearly belong.
The risk of abuse of localism by under-insulated district judges
in judicial review of state laws does exist; although it is surely less
pronounced than in the case of state judges, especially those that
are elected to office. 6 9 This risk can be ameliorated, to some extent
at least, by robust judicial selection and appointment mechanisms.
The current federal judicial appointment process already com-
bines local and national politics, each checking and balancing the
abuses of the other."7 Given the enhanced stakes of judicial ap-
pointments under the inferiorizing model, these procedures may
need to be revamped to ensure the political and social independ-
ence of the judges. And following suggestions made with respect to
the Supreme Court, the very laws of judicial appointment and ten-
ure should possibly be rethought-limited terms, staggered
appointments, super-majority confirmation requirements-in order
to institutionally diversify the political profile of districtjudiciaries.
169. See further discussion infra Part VI.C.
170. See Sarah Wilson, Appellate Judicial Appointments During the Clinton Presidency: An In-
side Perspective, 5 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 29, 31 (2003) ("Consultation with home-state
senators -as a critical part of the pre-nornination stage of the [Clinton Administration judi-
cial] appointment process.").
1030 University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 43:4
4. Costs of Added Litigation
By eliminating stare decisis effects in judicial review cases, one can
plausibly expect an increase in the quantity of such claims brought
before district courts: if the fact that Judge A decided someone
else's claims in a certain way does not affect my chances of getting
a different result from Judge B, I might as well give it a shot. The
argument therefore is that aggregating a constitutional position
from multiple lower-court iterations would entail greater expenses
from more litigants, as well as an increase in the constitutional
docket of trial courts. These are all wasteful costs, compared to the
fairly economizing system of centralizing appeal.
This point may be correct; though, as with other "floodgates"
arguments, it is difficult to assess, and more so to quantify.' One
simple rejoinder is that the inferiorizing model saves parties and
the judiciary the costs of litigating claims of judicial review on ap-
peal and in the Supreme Court. This should counterbalance some
of the direct costs involved in the proliferation of final judicial re-
view determinations. Further, and more profoundly, this Article is
concerned with the challenge of conceiving institutional avenues
for the exercise of popular constitutionalism. By shifting the gaze
to the trial courts, it aims to show that such avenues already exist
and are already functioning in ways that are accommodating to
visions of popular constitutionalists. The utilization of the existing
court system, even with an increased constitutional caseload, would
save the unknown costs of devising, establishing, and inculcating
novel institutional modes for this purpose.72
C. Fairness
The objection here is straightforward: under the inferiorizing
model, similar cases get treated differently, without the prospect of
equalizing redress by a higher court, and this is not fair or just. For
a simple example, consider two drivers apprehended on a highway
in violation of the statutory speed limit. One manages to persuade
ajudge that the speed limit is an unconstitutional intervention into
his or her personal liberty, and is acquitted. The other tries to
171. See Toby J. Stem, Federal Judges and Fearing the "Floodgates of Litigation," 6 U. PA. J.
CONST. L. 377, 402-03 (2003).
172. Consider, for example, such explicitly expensive models as Ackerman and Fishkin's
Deliberation Day, which proposes substantial quadrennial cash payments to all participating
Americans of voting age. Bruce Ackerman &James S. Fishkin, Deliberation Day, in DEBATING
DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY 7 (James S. Fishkin & Peter Laslett eds., 2003).
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make the same argument to another judge-maybe in the same
district, maybe in another-but the constitutional claim is flatly
rejected, and the driver is convicted. Because the state cannot ap-
peal the constitutional determination in the first case, and the
driver cannot appeal the denial of her constitutional claim in the
second case, the result is a lingering disparity in judicial treatment
with no clear justification.
I have three responses to the fairness-based objection. I hope
that, at least when combined, they will clarify why this concern is
not sufficient to defeat the inferiorizing model.
(1) Disparity is all around us. Although the speed limit example is
a correct depiction of how the inferiorizing model works, I think it
is pretty clear that such lingering disparity in judicial outcomes is a
common, indeed institutionally inherent, characteristic of any legal
system. Undocumented and unappealable judicial idiosyncrasies
often decide cases one way or another. A jury may nullify charges
with no rational reason. A party may choose not to appeal a deci-
sion, or fail to appeal it in time, or to produce the required fees.
An appellate court may, correctly or erroneously, treat what seems
to be a legal determination as a factual one, or vice versa. The Su-
preme Court may decide not to grant certiorari, for good or bad
reason. And even if a question does receive conclusive treatment
by the Supreme Court, the Court's decision would not always apply
to previous cases that were decided otherwise.
Disparity in judicial outcomes is the inevitable result of a system
that employs multiple judges, whose discretionary acts are too
plentiful to be constantly checked by a centralized review function:
this is the core realization of the literature on street-level bureauc-
racies. People are not the same, and when one gives a large group
of people the power to discretionarily decide individual cases
(cases which are, in addition, often initiated and withdrawn ac-
cording to the independent discretion of the clients), a variety of
results will ensue. In this respect, it is not clear that the fairness
costs of the inferiorizing model would be greater than those in-
curred today.
(2) Making judges responsive. Perhaps the more important point
to make is this: the inferiorizing model is not about letting district
judges loose. It is not an argument for substituting nine justices
with 800 justices.'"3 It perceives a constitutional dynamic that does
not end with judicial iteration, but rather exists in a continuing
deliberation among constituents, among courts, and among
173. The federal judiciary currently consists of 179 appellate judgeships, 28 U.S.C.
§ 44(a) (2006), and 655 district courtjudgeships, 28 U.S.C. § 133(a) (2006).
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constituents and courts, over issues of constitutional meaning. It is
about developing more sophisticated and more deliberatively de-
mocratic modes of communicating constitutional understandings
and expectations to judges, and among judges themselves. If over
time some judicial outcomes on a certain topic become clearly in-
consistent with prevalent popular constitutional understandings
(exhibited, for example, in recurring, explicitly contrarian legisla-
tive acts), then conscientious judges are expected to internalize
these signals and refine their decision-making accordingly: there is
a limit to the amount of drivers who could bail themselves out of a
speeding ticket on a constitutional liberty-based challenge (at
most, that limit is the Article V amendment procedure). Even the
Supreme Court, Barry Friedman tells us, seems quite responsive to
popular constitutionalist signals. 74 District judges, who decide
many more cases and face actual litigants on a daily basis, seem
even better located to assess popular sentiments (albeit on a local
level) and to apply the Constitution responsively.
(3) Disciplining judges. Finally, popular mobilization and delib-
eration are not the only ways to induce responsiveness among
judges. Popular constitutionalism perceives politics as a central
mode of forming constitutional arguments and opinions and con-
veying them to courts. Familiar historical examples abound:
impeachment, budgetary parsimony, court-packing, and appoint-
ment strategies are all available mechanisms-each with its
different implications and complications-for reciprocating judi-
cial deviance. All of these should of course not be used lightly, and
it is worth noting that in the United States, so far, they have not.'75
But they are available for dealing with judges who would refuse to
participate in the deliberative process that is essential to the inferi-
orizing move. And it makes sense that these tools are even better
suited to deal with clearly deviant district judges-a few out of
hundreds-than with a group of nine singularly prominent Su-
preme Courtjustices.
VI. COMPLICATIONS TO THE INFERIORIZING MODEL
In this Part, I consider the force and the extent of the inferioriz-
ing model when faced with four paradigmatic kinds of
complicating circumstances. I ask whether and how the model of
judicial review by trial courts can meaningfully deal with blatantly
174. Friedman, supra note 131.
175. See Kramer, Response, supra note 137, at 1180.
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immoral statutes, with conditions of emergency, with the unique
institutional background of a federal system, and with the realities
of constitutional democracies that lack the institutional and/or
political traditions that sustain the democratic potential of inferior-
izing judicial review. These complications may require more
elaborate institutional design as part of the inferiorizing model.
A. Evil Laws
The challenge here is whether the constitutional system has ro-
bust and efficient means of dealing with blatantly immoral
majoritarian acts: what if Congress made a law eliminating the
right of all non-white Americans to existing health and welfare ser-
vices? Or eliminating the right of all women to vote? Such acts-of
more or less clear unconstitutionality-seem to beg for immediate
and sweeping countermajoritarian action. A single, centralized,
and supreme court offers just this kind of possibility. An inferior-
ized, diffuse system of judicial review arguably does not: it requires
multiple petitions to multiple courts with a diverse array of judges
that may come out one way or another. The blatant immorality may
linger, at least in some regions.
It is true that localism has not always fared well in the just fight
against discrimination and abuse of power. However, centralization
has produced its own set of reprehensible results. Dred Scott,'
176
Plessy,'7 and Korematsu178 stand as solid evidence for that. The opin-
ions of the Supreme Court in all three cases may have been legally
sound according to one measure or another, but few would argue
today that they came out on the right side of (currently) prevalent
moral sensibilities in liberal democracies, even given the constitu-
tional texts they were interpreting.
If I am correct in my suspicion that Supreme Court justices are
just as morally fallible as district court judges, the question then
becomes what kind of risk those who fight immorality by legal
means are willing to take: the risk of the Supreme Court getting it
wrong once and for all, or the risk of some district courts getting it
wrong while others get it right. Going for the Supreme Court op-
tion means, of course, that in some cases we will get a conclusive
correct answer-Brown 9 being a prominent example-and this is
the lure of the centralized model. The inferiorized model means
176. Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
177. Plessyv. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
178. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
179. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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we will have many correct answers in each and every case, but also
possibly many bad outcomes. Which risk is better? Naturally, we
would like to answer this question based on what we know about
the courts in question: is this a Warren Court or a Fuller Court?
Were most district judges appointed by President George W. Bush
or by President Clinton? This sort of information, though, cannot
be considered in the stage of institutional design, which takes place
behind a "veil of ignorance." The question for the institutional de-
signer is which risk is preferable, without knowing how the courts
will look or act.
This is by no means an easy choice. For example, a plausible ar-
gument in support of the centralized risk is the disparity cost
involved in the diffuse system: it might be both morally and strate-
gically better for a group to suffer immoral treatment (e.g.,
discrimination) en masse, rather than be fractured into sub-groups
of the lucky and the unlucky, the privileged and the unprivileged.
Still, I think it would be better to take the risks involved in dispa-
rate adjudication of immoral acts than the risk of conclusive,
colossal moral failure by a single Supreme Court decision. Recall
what we get with the diffuse model of judicial review: a series of
decisions, some good, some bad, that involve local actors and invite
further legal and political action. In the absence of precedential
effect, challenges can keep being brought, and successes in one
court or one district can affect policies and strategies in others.
The inferiorized model is dynamic-it leaves room for change and
revision and allows for an ongoing cumulative effect. It took the
Supreme Court almost sixty years to switch from Plessy to Brown.
Sixty years of district court adjudication is an eternity-in the
number of cases, in the chances for dialogue and responsiveness,
in repeated challenges, and in personnel shifts.
B. Emergencies
What if a constitutional question arises that requires immediate
social resolution, such that there is not enough time to spin the
wheels of political deliberation, an essential component of the in-
feriorizing model? Imagine, for instance, Congress (or a state
legislature) passing in July a statute exercising eminent domain
over all private water supplies in preparation for a possibly excep-
tionally hot and dry August. How can the citizenry meaningfully
weigh in on the constitutionality of such an act in a matter of
weeks? The inferiorizing model, the argument goes, is not set to
[VOL. 43:4
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deal with pressing constitutional questions. Let me make two
points.
The first thing to remember about the model of popular consti-
tutionalism in trial courts-in contrast, for example, to Mark
Tushnet's extreme model of constitutionalism without judicial re-
view at all' 8 -is that the inferiorizing model guarantees that every
constitutional challenge will receive a judicial decision. If the con-
cern is merely about immediate availability of judicial redress, then
the inferiorizing model accounts for that: district courts will decide
constitutional challenges and generate outcomes even in condi-
tions of emergency, as they do today.
But the concern clearly is about more than having an applicable
judicial decision. It is about generating salient constitutional delib-
eration in a short period of time. The Supreme Court is relatively
good in providing this service-consider Bush v. Gore, 81 or last-
minute death penalty petitions. 82 It draws the focus of the nation
on a specific question, and expresses the importance of the issue
by ceremonial measures. Thus, what is usually a debilitating effect
on the popular forces of constitutionalism may become useful
when popular constitutionalism, and the collective action dynamics
it entails, is debilitated by the pressures of emergency. The inferior-
izing model could, therefore, include some sort of a "fast track"
mechanism that would enable specific constitutional challenges,
under special conditions of emergency, to be decided by a higher
court. This would require a mechanism for determining which
cases get to switch to the fast track-leaving that to the Supreme
Court or to any single district court would create an option of de-
feating the pluralizing effects of the inferiorizing model whenever
that court sees fit. So here too there would be a need for a diffuse,
while efficient, procedure: consider, for example, polling judges
from various districts, or convening ajudicial session similar to the
federal Multi-District Panels that adjudicate complex cases culled
into a single litigation from various districts.'
180. TUSHNET, supra note 13, at 154.
181. 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
182. See Austin Sarat, The Cultural Life of Capital Punishment: Responsibility and Representa-
tion in Dead Man Walking and Last Dance, 11 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 153, 182 (1999) ("[I]t is
the stay, the drama of the possibility of the stay, that renders the execution constitutional
violence... ." (quoting Cover, supra note 104, at 1624)); see also Stephen Reinhardt, The
Supreme Court, the Death Penalty, and the Harris Case, 102 YALE L.J. 205 (1992).
183. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 1407(d) (West 2006); Daniel A. Richards, An Analysis of the Judicial
Panel on Multidistrict Litigation's Selection of Transferee District and Judge, 78 FORDHAM L. REv.
311,314-17 (2009).
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C. Federalism
Isn't federalism the best inferiorizing option? One can argue
that the simplest, most established, and possibly most genuinely
reflective apparatus for promoting localism and diversity in consti-
tutional adjudication is by relegating the power of judicial review
to state judicial systems. Institutionally this would mean making
state courts the sole enforcers of the Federal Constitution in judi-
cial review cases. This is a broad and complicated issue that goes to
the foundations of the federal structure-indeed to the need for
and functions of a federal government-and the relationship be-
tween the states and the union. The inferiorizing model presented
in this Article, however, retains the federal structure of adjudica-
tion in judicial review cases and is limited to a reallocation of
decisional power from Supreme to inferior courts.8 4 It does so for
several reasons, both methodological and substantive:
First, this Article is meant primarily to provide a model for re-
thinking the institutional conventions of judicial review. As a first
step in this direction, it is useful to apply it to a fairly simple institu-
tional grid, such as that of the federal judiciary. This allows us to
consider the effects of decentralizing judicial review before aug-
menting the model with the additional potential of federalized
jurisdictions.
Second, to the extent that popular modes of robust constitutional
deliberation are available in other democracies, then the inferioriz-
ing model could hopefully serve as a frame of thought for
comparative constitutionalists as well, and not only as an interven-
tion in U.S. constitutional thought. In this context federalism is but
one of several institutional variations through which the inferioriz-
ing model could play out.
Third, with regard to the substance of the matter, keeping lower
federal courts in the business of judicial review seems to alleviate
some of the concerns raised by those opposed to popular constitu-
tionalism in general, and by some of the objections to the
inferiorizing model presented above. Federal trial courts are a
combination of localism and centralization: they are spread
throughout the country and serve local constituencies, but they
also belong to a single institutional body (the federal judiciary),
and thus share the same trial procedures, administrative organiza-
tions, appointment mechanisms (including, importantly, no
184. In addition, as stated at the outset, the inferiorizing model presented in this Article
is limited to rights-related constitutional claims. This excludes questions of the applicability
of the model to judicial review in federalism issues (for example, Commerce Clause litiga-
tion), that raise distinct concerns of uniformity and coordination.
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judicial elections), and whatever else falls under the concept of
institutional culture-federal judges meet regularly, sit on commit-
tees, and share a commitment to a single hierarchical structure.
These are all guarantees of partial independence from local poli-
tics, and they complement the independence from centralized
control of constitutionalism that is achieved through the inferioriz-
ing move. Indeed, federal district courts present a unique
combination of diffusion and localism on the one hand, and pro-
fessionalism and insularity on the other hand-a combination that
serves as a novel legitimating basis forjudicial review.
D. Fragile Democracies'8'
A challenging complication to the inferiorizing model ofjudicial
review is the question of its applicability to other constitutional
democracies, and more specifically to democracies that are still in
the process of defining their constitutional order and forming the
social and political institutions that would uphold it. The concerns
may be diverse: The process of entrenchment of a constitutional
and democratic discourse among both judges and laypeople is at
different stages in different countries. Societies may have different
levels of commitment to, and different degrees of experience with,
open and informed political discussion. Systems of mediation and
responsiveness between courts and society may be at different lev-
els of development and may face various barriers. The robustness
of judicial appointment mechanisms may diverge, in a way that
would affect judicial independence and enhance the risks of invisi-
ble adjudication over its posited benefits. Finally, some countries
and some judiciaries may be too small to warrant or to sustain an
active practice ofjudicial review by trial courts.
These are all genuine concerns that call for a contextualized
design of the institutions of judicial review: what seems right for
the United States may not be right for Argentina, or Hungary, or
Iraq. However, while most emerging constitutional democracies
in the past several decades have opted for highly centralized
models of constitutional adjudication,"" it would be wrong to dis-
regard the potential for trial courts to serve as vehicles of
constitutional deliberation even in conditions of transition and
self-definition. If one accepts the importance of popular partici-
pation and deliberation in defining constitutional meanings as
185. See Samuel Issacharoff. Frazie Democracies, 120 HARV. L. REv. 1405 (2007).
186. See, e.g., SADURSKI, supra note 115, at 65-85.
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essentials of a robust constitutional democracy, then trial courts-
which (along with schools?) are possibly the most continuously
stable governmental bureaucracies-should be considered as
primary vehicles for these purposes, including their capacity to
exercise judicial review.
But intermediate institutional possibilities are also available.
Even a limited maneuver such as splitting high court benches into
panels, rather than hearing cases en banc, would provide the consti-
tutional system with multiple judicial results, with some (if limited)
diversity. Consider the German Constitutional Court, which is insti-
tutionally divided into two panels of eight justices, or indeed the
Supreme Court of India, which employs 26 justices who sit in pan-
els of two or three.1 8 A more significant institutional variation was
mentioned above: the idea of the "supreme trial court"-a high
court that hears as a court of first instance a multitude of constitu-
tional challenges. Such a court would hear and decide many
constitutional cases, while facilitating the direct engagement be-
tween individual and government that is the participatory core of
the inferiorizing model. A notable example is Israel, which still
lacks a fully framed constitution and therefore also the textual mat-
ter for trial judges to expound, where the Supreme Court (sitting as
the High Court of Justice) has fostered a constitutional discourse
through repetitive adjudication over time of scores of first-instance
189cases.
VII. CONCLUSION
In an often cited admonition, Sanford Levinson has already
called upon legal scholars to face their preoccupation with Su-
preme Court practices and to embrace a more inclusive
perspective, one cognizant of the vastly more prolific and accessi-
ble work of inferior courts:
187. See Sarang Vijay Damle, Note, Specialize the Judge, Not the Court: A Lesson from the Ger-
man Constitutional Court, 91 VA. L. REv. 1267, 1297-98 (2005).
188. See Supreme Court of India, Law, Courts and the Constitution, http://
www.supremecourtofindia.nic.in/new.s/constitution.htm (on file with the University of
Michigan Journal of Law Reform).
189. Israel is actually a curious case, since it combines centralized and diffuse systems of
judicial review: when it sits as the High Court of Justice, the Supreme Court hears constitu-
tional (and some administrative) cases as a court of first instance, admitting (mostly written)
evidence, and deciding thousands of petitions every year; however constitutional claims may
also be brought through the regular course of litigation, beginning at a lower trial court and
eventually reaching the Supreme Court sitting as the High Court of Appeals (the same jus-
tices occupy both roles). See NAVOT, supra note 60.
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I want to focus on the obvious fact that the Supreme Court is
only one relatively small aspect of our overall judicial system.
If one stays only at the federal level.... we see twelve circuit
courts and ninety district courts. Not only are they far more
numerous than the Supreme Court, they also, as a matter of
empirical fact, play a far more important role in the actual
lives of citizens than does the Supreme Court.9 °
This insight is of course correct; and it applies all the more so to
those courts that even Professor Levinson chose (albeit consciously)
to bracket: state trial courts, which process about 98% of the cases
managed by courts in this country, 91 and are thus the actual face of
"the law" to most people, much more than any or all of the federal
courts. However, the shift in focus from the constitutional practices
of the Supreme Court to those of the inferior courts that I propose
in this Article is not based on the mere empirical fact that most ad-
judication (constitutional and other) takes place in the latter.
Rather, it is based on the recognition that inferior courts offer some-
thing else, a potential for deliberation-inducing and pluralist
constitutional adjudication that cannot happen in "one supreme
Court," and that is inhibited by the structural possibility of Supreme
Court review. The inferior courts are not only the place where con-
stituents most frequently "meet the law," they are also the place
where constituents can participate in a meaningful way in making
and remaking the law.
This is an argument about institutional capacities and their op-
timal utilization. It is not about who is better or more important
and therefore deserves more attention or respect or power. I do
not seek to discredit supreme courts or their justices-these are
courts like most other courts, and justices, title aside, are judges
like most other judges. But a supreme court's capacity to provoke
effective deliberation through popular modes of constitutionalism
is limited by its institutional singularity, its national saliency, and
the meager amount of opinions it is capable of producing. In con-
trast, when left alone-by the unreviewable realities of
individualized discretion, by invisibility-rendering design, and by
190. Levinson, supra note 54, at 844; see also Kreimer, supra note 54, at 430 ("The voice
in which the judiciary speaks the Constitution to most of the population is not the sonorous
pronouncements of the Supreme Court's explications, but the somewhat terse and often
hurried tones of the trial judge denying or granting motions for summary judgment or sup-
pression of evidence.").
191. See Marc Galanter, A World Without Trials?, 2006J. DIsp. RESOL. 7, 9; Stratos Pahis,
Note, Corruption in Our Courts: VWhat It Looks Like and Where It Is Hidden, 118 YALE L.J. 1900,
1922 & n.47 (2009).
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systematic multiplication-inferior courts can become responsive
innovators of diverse and pluralistic understandings of the Consti-
tution. While resolving scores of constitutional disputes (thus
enforcing the Constitution against majoritarian abuse on a case-by-
case basis), they can also provide the discursive ground for popular
constitutionalist moves in and out of the courts, and thus foster the
democratic ideals of participation, deliberation, and pluralism.
Rather than precluding popular constitutionalism, the courts (in
place of "the Court") become its facilitators.
Although in diffuse systems of constitutional adjudication the
institutional capacity to inferiorize judicial review actually already
exists, it is of course difficult to fathom such an extreme change
happening in the near future. In the United States and elsewhere,
supreme courts have lately become even more prominent players
in the constitutional field; they do not seem intent on giving up
their power of judicial review. Politicians, litigants, and jurists fol-
low suit, partially by default to the intellectual benefits of custom
and habit, and partially due to what seems like an optimism bias,
grounded in a magnified appreciation of certain morally successful
high court cases. But the Supreme Court can and does come out in
different ways on different topics of constitutional interpretation,
sometimes splitting according to what seems to be the mere politi-
cal fortuity embedded in the judicial appointment process.
Pluralizing judicial review by relegating it to trial courts would
probably guarantee that all sides to a dispute get to win some and
to lose some. This would mean that the judicial record on any con-
stitutional question would always be imperfect, from any moral
standpoint. But at the same time it would provide us with a vast
and newly recognized resource for arguing about constitutional
questions through the popular modes of deliberation, that is,
through politics: an aggregation of many judicial pronouncements,
producing various forms of reasoning and outcomes in a multitude
of test cases. Some issues would ignite continuing popular debate,
with signals running back and forth between legislators, litigants,
juries, and judges, until a trajectory is plotted. Some issues would
reveal themselves as straightforward, evoking a clear judicial con-
192. Various procedural mechanisms for effecting an inferiorized model come to mind.
Congress could legislate jurisdiction-shifting laws; appellate courts could exercise Bickelian
"passive virtues" by setting deferential standards of review of trial courts' constitutional de-
terminations; litigants could be educated away from the tendency to appeal an unfavorable
constitutional result, instead encouraged (or incentivized) to pursue non-judicial avenues
for fighting an adverse decision. While an exploration of the practical mechanisms for infe-




sensus; others as minute or uninteresting, leaving politics unen-
gaged even in the face of inter-judicial dissention.
Doing popular constitutionalism through the trial courts takes
away some of the movement's liberating force: it calls us back into
courts, just as we were starting to seriously explore what is happen-
ing-and what could happen-away from courts. But I think that
the benefit for the conceptual robustness of popular constitution-
alism is considerable: by realigning relatively few jurisdictional
demarcations, the model of inferiorized judicial review turns an
established, long-standing, familiar social event-the trial-into an
institutional backbone for truly popular (in the sense of participa-
tory and pluralist) deliberation on the meaning of the
Constitution, in and out of courts.
Commenting in 2006 on the future of the intellectual project he
had a central role in forming, Larry Kramer concluded:
If there is an agenda for constitutionalism today, its first con-
cern is not substantive. It is institutional. We should not say
"popular constitutionalism can't work, so turn the Constitu-
tion over to the Court." We should, rather, be asking what
kind of institutions we can construct to make popular consti-
tutionalism work, because we need new ones. We need to start
rethinking and building institutions that can make democ-
ratic constitutionalism possible. And we need to start doing so
193now.
I agree fully; I only wonder whether at least some of the new in-
stitutions of which we are in need are actually already up and
running, just waiting for us to take notice and put to use.
193. Kramer, Response, supra note 137, at 1182.
SUMMER 20101 1041

